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In this work I argue that David Hume’s classification of the virtue of justice as artificial is 
mistaken, and propose that the possibility of the existence of a natural virtue of justice should be 
taken seriously within Hume’s moral framework. In the first chapter of this work, I present 
Hume’s moral theory, with a focus on Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues. 
In the second chapter, I argue that Hume’s certainty concerning the classification of justice as an 
artificial virtue is mistaken, and offer a positive account of the possibility of a natural origin, and 
ultimately a natural virtue of justice. In the third chapter I will entertain possible objections 
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This work concerns David Hume’s distinction between what he names the natural virtues 
and the artificial virtues. Hume, notably, argues that justice, which under his rather limited 
interpretation is honesty with respect to property, should undoubtedly be understood as one of 
the artificial virtues. So, on Hume’s account, justice arises not from a simple original instinct 
which nature has implanted within the human breast, as the natural virtues have, but instead 
arises out of a human convention invented to satisfy the needs and necessities of humans, as an 
artificial solution intended to solve the problems humans face. This work will argue that Hume’s 
certainty concerning the categorization of justice as an artificial virtue was a mistake. I will argue 
that the possibility of a natural origin of justice is not only feasible within Hume’s moral 
framework, but is also an explanatory option which should be taken seriously. 
In the first chapter of this work Hume’s moral theory, as I understand it, will be presented 
with an especially hearty focus on Hume’s claims concerning the distinction between the natural 
and artificial virtues, the differences in the origin of these two different types of virtue, and the 
placement of the virtue of justice within this distinction. In the second chapter it will be argued 
that Hume’s certainty concerning the classification of justice as an artificial virtue was a mistake. 
The main arguments Hume gives to reject the possibility of a natural origin of justice will be 
presented and responded to, and a positive account of the possible natural virtue of justice will be 
offered and defended.  In the third chapter of this work an objection Hume might offer, 
concerning a possible confusion of cause and effect, to my positive account of a possible natural 




reason to carefully consider the possibility of a natural explanation of the virtue of justice, and 





























Section I: Hume’s Moral Theory 
Before Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues is presented, it will be 
beneficial to the overall current project to give a brief and very general summary of the major 
points of Hume’s moral theory which are presented in his works A Treatise of Human Nature 
Book 3, “Of Morals” and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.
1
 In his work Hume’s 
Moral Theory, J.L. Mackie explains Hume’s primary overall moral project in what I found to be 
a very clear and concise way. Hume’s  
question is a demand for an explanation of the sort typically given by the empirical 
sciences: ‘here is this curious phenomenon, human morality, a cluster of attitudes, 
dispositions, practices, behavioral tendencies, and so one that we find almost universally 
among men… why is it there, and how did it develop? (Mackie 6). 
 
Famously Hume claims that “reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” (Treatise 2.3.3.4). 
Although this claim is presented in a much tamer way in Hume’s later work, his second Enquiry, 
it still maintains its importance, and prominence within Hume’s moral theory. Before this claim 
can be clarified some quick definitional work must first be considered.  
When considering Hume’s use of the word ‘reason’ it is most helpful to think of 
knowledge. As Mackie explains, knowledge “whether of a priori truths or of empirical facts, all 
beliefs, and all rational calculation” fall under Hume’s heading of reason (1). When considering 
Hume’s use of the term ‘passions’ one may be tempted to immediately consider only those 
things that one feels passionately about, or things that cause passionate feelings, but this would 
be incorrect (Baillie 40). Instead what we consider as strong, or violent, emotions is a much 
                                                             
1 Here after “The Treatise” and “The Enquiry.” No reference will be made to Hume’s first Enquiry until the 




better understanding of Hume’s use of the term passions, although these emotions need not 
always be violent, he does hold that in general the passions will be violent or strong emotions 
(Treatise 2.1.1.3). Hume explains that “bodily pains and pleasures are the source of many 
passions,” and that this source requires no preceding thought or perception (Treatise 2.1.1.2). For 
example, “A fit of the gout produces a long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not 
deriv’d immediately from any affection or idea” (Treatise 2.1.1.2). Hume holds that there are 
direct passions and indirect passions. “By direct passions I understand such as arise immediately 
from good or evil, from pain or pleasure,” such as: desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, 
despair, and security (Treatise 2.1.1.4). “By indirect such as proceed from the same principles [as 
the direct passions], but by the conjunction of other qualities,” such as, primarily: pride, 
humility, love, and hatred (Treatise 2.1.1.4). 
With this terminology in mind we can now examine Hume’s claim that “reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve 
and obey them” (Treatise 2.3.3.4). What Hume means by this claim concerns, what Mackie calls, 
Hume’s psychology of action. Mackie explains, Hume’s “view is that all knowledge, whether of 
a priori truths or of empirical facts, all beliefs, and all rational calculation are by themselves 
inert” (1). So, nothing which falls under the heading of ‘reason’ is able to, on its own, offer a 
motive for action, or inaction. Hume holds that when we are in fact motivated to act we can be 
sure reason has not been performing alone. For Hume, “motivation for or against any action 
requires something else, what he would call a passion or sentiment, and more particularly a 
desire” (Mackie 1). Thus, for Hume one must have a desire to complete action X, to be 




As was earlier presented in the Treatise, Hume maintains that reason is a part of the 
motivation to act, but in one’s motivation to act attends the passions in a subservient roll. In the 
Enquiry Hume allows for reason and the passions to work on closer to equal grounds, but with 
the passions always manning the helm. As Baillie explains Hume “is making a claim about the 
structure of motivation, and denying reason the major role in the genesis of action” (89). Hume 
is not claiming that reason plays no role in his psychology of action; it merely plays a lessor role 
than the passions do.  
The next central feature of Hume’s moral theory involves his claims concerning moral 
distinctions. Although two distinct claims are actually made regarding this topic (in two different 
sections in the third book of the Treatise), they can, roughly, be summarized as such: moral 
distinctions are not derived from reason, but are instead derived from the moral sentiments, or a 
moral sense
2
. Hume claims that moral distinctions, a distinction between those character traits 
which are virtuous and those which are vicious, or what one can think of as morally right or good 
traits and morally wrong or bad traits, cannot be derived from reason alone. Hume asserts that 
since moral distinctions, or morals as he calls them, motivate one to act we can safely be assured 
that reason is not acting alone in making said distinctions, because, as was examined above, 
Hume holds that reason alone can never motivate one’s will to act. “Since morals, therefore, 
have an influence on the actions and affections it follows, that they cannot be deriv’d from 
reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov’d, can never have any such 
influence” (Treatise 3.1.1.6). Hume provides an example to support his claims concerning moral 
distinctions. He considers the act of willful murder, and concludes that if willful murder is 
examined in every rational way possible, including the character traits one must possess to 
                                                             
2 As Mackie points out when Hume uses the word “sense” here, it should carry none of the troublesome difficulties 
it would if it were interpreted as it is in “sense-perception.” Rather Hume means “sense” as we use it when we talk 




commit willful murder, we will not find “that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call 
vice” (Treatise 3.1.1.26). Thus, Hume is able to conclude that “the rules of morality, therefore, 
are not conclusions of our reason” (Treatise 3.1.1.6). 
Instead, Hume holds that to find that which we call vice in some character trait or action, 
willful murder for example, you must “turn your reflection into your own breast, and find a 
sentiment of disapprobation, which arises in you, towards this action” (Treatise 3.1.1.26). Hume 
claims that this sense of disapprobation towards willful murder is the matter of fact we were 
looking for, but “’tis the object of feeling, not of reason,” and one that lies within us (Treatise 
3.1.1.26). Hume associates this feeling of disapprobation with uneasiness or pain. At this point it 
is important to note, for the purpose of an important distinction, that Hume commits to the claim 
that: 
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only as a sign of some quality or character. 
It must depend upon durable principles of mind, which extend over the whole conduct, 
and enter into the personal character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any 
constant principle, have no influence on love, hatred, pride or humility; and consequently 
are never consider’d in morality (Treatise 3.3.1.4). 
 
So we find our labeling of any act, or more specifically, as the above passage illustrates any 
character trait which motivates some act, such as willful murder, as vicious only when we 
acknowledge the sense of disapprobation we have and feel towards a character trait or traits 
which would motivate one to act in such a way.  
Likewise, we understand a character trait to be virtuous if the contemplation of it arises 
within us a feeling of approbation or agreeableness (Treatise 3.1.2.1). So, we must still turn our 
reflection inward, but when faced with virtue the feeling which arises will be a pleasure or 
agreeableness, devoid of all uneasiness and pain. For example, when we know a person to be 




is virtuous. As Hume explains, “to have a sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a 
particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or 
admiration” (Treatise 3.1.2.3). Thus, “an action, or sentiment, or character trait is virtuous or 
vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind”  (Treatise 
3.1.2.3). These sentiments of pleasure and pain, which enable us to make moral distinctions, are 
associated with our passions of pride and humility, and love and hatred.
3
 When one has a feeling 
of approbation towards some character trait we feel love of that trait and possessor of that trait, 
likewise we hate the pain we feel towards vicious character traits. We feel pride when we have a 
feeling of approbation towards a trait of our own, and are humbled by the pain the possession of 
a vicious character trait causes us (Treatise 3.3.1.3). 
Importantly, Hume does stipulate that it is not every instance of pleasure or pain which 
will arise in us an ascription of virtue or vice. These instances of pleasure and pain must be of a 
“particular kind.” “’Tis only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference to our 
particular interests, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it morally good or 
evil” (Treatise 3.1.2.4). Hume provides an analogy to aid in this distinction. When one hears a 
talented singer performing a particular kind of pleasure is felt, but if a specific listener knows the 
singer to be an enemy, or rival of his, then it might be hard for that listener to be sensible, and 
agree that the singing is pleasurable. Hume points out that a listener “of a fine ear, who has the 
command of himself, can separate these feelings, and give praise to what deserves it” (Treatise 
3.1.2.4). In like manner we must be able to separate our feelings, most importantly our feelings 
of self-interests, when considering moral issues, and praise what deserves it. Although this may 
                                                             
3 It should be noted that different interpreters of Hume claim different relations between these four passions, and our 
moral sentiments. “Some interpreters analyze the moral sentiments as themselves forms of these four passions; 
others argue that Hume's moral sentiments are pleasures and pains that tend to cause the latter passions” (Cohon). I 
maintain, leaning towards the latter camp, that James Fieser is correct in claiming that these passions are caused by 




seem like a tall order, Hume has confidence in our ability to do this concerning moral 
distinctions. Hume claims our “quick sensibility… is so universal among mankind” that it 
enables the philosopher to do this quite easily. The philosopher “needs only enter into his own 
breast for a moment, and consider whether or not he should desire to have this or that quality 
ascribed to him, and whether such or such an imputation would proceed from a friend or enemy” 
(Enquiry 1.1.10).  
Hume holds that these moral sentiments, which are so important in making distinctions 
between vice and virtue, are results of the operation of the psychological function or mechanism 
of sympathy. Thus, “sympathy is the chief source of moral distinctions” (Treatise 3.3.6.1). 
Essentially, sympathy for Hume, which may sound more like empathy after this general account 
is given, allows one to feel the pain and pleasure felt by others as a result of certain character 
traits, or actions resulting from specific character traits. “The minds of all men are similar in their 
feelings and operations; nor can any one be actuated by any affection, of which all others are not, 
in some degree, susceptible” (Treatise 3.3.1.7). So, for example, when we learn of some stranger 
who has acted benevolently towards others, even when said benevolence does not affect us at all, 
we still feel a sentiment of approbation or pleasure towards that character trait, similarly to how 
we would have if some personal friend had acted benevolently towards us. Sympathy is likely 
the most important aspect of Hume’s moral theory, because the operations of sympathy have 
“force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbations” (Treatise 3.3.6.1). 
Sympathy is what enables us to be affected by the happiness, resulting from virtue, of strangers 
and importantly by public utility in general. It also, conversely, enables us to feel the pain of 
others caused by vice. For Hume, Sympathy alone is what enables us “to feel approbation in 




function that we feel a sense of approbation towards character traits which result in public good, 
and promote public interest. Hume notes that one might object to this understanding of sympathy 
by claiming that sympathy is itself variable, as we may feel a stronger connection to those we 
know then those we don’t. So morality must too be variable. For example, we might feel that it is 
a greater wrong for one of our friends to be harmed in some way, than for a stranger to be 
harmed, because we feel a stronger pain when sympathizing with a friend than a stranger. To this 
Hume response “notwithstanding this variation of our sympathy, we give the same approbation 
to the same moral qualities in China as in England. They appear equally virtuous and 
recommend themselves equally to the esteem of a judicious spectator.” (Treatise 3.3.1.14).  
Now that Hume’s concept of virtue and vice has been presented it is possible to examine 
a very important division Hume makes concerning virtue. This division is between that of the 
natural virtues and the artificial virtues.
4
 This distinction is very important as it not only will 
enable us to know which virtues we can naturally have and which we have only by means of an 
artificial human convention, but it will also enable us to know which virtues we naturally 
approve of, and which we approve of due to an artificial human convention (Mackie 76). I will 




To understand Hume’s natural virtues, we must first explore what he means by ‘natural.’ 
Hume presents three different understandings of the term ‘natural,’ in an effort to initially 
present his intended use of the term, via a process of elimination. Hume holds “we can 
                                                             
4 It is important to note that Hume abandons the use of the terms “natural virtues” and “artificial virtues” in the 
Enquiry, but, importantly, the distinction itself remains, only with slightly different language. I will use the terms 
natural and artificial throughout this entire work, as a way to distinguish between these two kinds of virtue, and I 
hold that doing so does not alter any commitment Hume makes in the Enquiry. 
 
5 It should be noted that this is the opposite order of presentation which Hume utilizes in the Treatise, but is the 
order which Baillie presents them, and the one I chose in an attempt to better illustrate the differences between these 




distinguish three senses of ‘natural’, depending on whether it is contrasted with the miraculous, 
the unusual, or the artificial” (Baillie 153). “If nature be oppos’d to miracles, not only the 
distinction betwixt vice and virtue is natural, but also every event, which has ever happen’d in 
the world,” except, Hume sarcastically adds “those miracles, on which our religion is founded” 
would be natural (Treatise 3.1.2.6). Thus, if we understand ‘natural’ in this way we would be 
saying very little, if not nothing at all. Next, ‘natural’ can be understood as opposed to rare or 
unusual. Although Hume holds that this may be the most standard understanding of natural, it 
too does not alone enable us any greater understanding of the distinction between virtues, 
because “if ever there was any thing, which cou’d be call’d natural in this sense, the sentiments 
of morality certainly may; since there never was any nation of the world, nor any single person in 
any nation, who was utterly depriv’d of them” (Treatise 3.1.2.8). So, this too, would eliminate 
any distinction, as all virtues would seem to be natural, as we have a sentiment of approbation 
towards both natural and artificial virtues, and these sentiments are far from rare or unusual. 
Ultimately, Hume lands on the understanding of ‘natural’ which is opposed to ‘artificial.’ 
Although contrasting natural with artificial may initially seem as if it has communicated very 
little about what ‘natural’ actually means, Hume will alleviate this confusion by clearly defining 
both terms.  
The key, then, to understanding what Hume intends by ‘natural’ lies within understanding 
what Hume means by ‘artificial.’ Although a much more detailed account of Hume’s artificial 
virtues will be provided below, roughly, for Hume something is artificial if it is the result of the 
circumstances and necessities of mankind or what can be thought of as a solution to problems the 
lack of such necessities could create (Treatise 3.2.1.1). We can now understand ‘natural’ as 




of mankind creates. So, conversely to artificial, “a mental process or character trait is natural if 
we possess it purely by being a normally functioning human being” (Baillie 153). This means 
something is natural, for Hume, if it is not a result or solution, or creation of mankind, but merely 
a consequence of being a normally functioning human being. Thus, we have, and approve of or 
disapprove of, character traits of this kind independently of any circumstances of our 
environment or culture, or any necessity that such circumstance may dictate (Baillie 153).   
Now that Hume’s definition of ‘natural’ has been presented, we can offer his account of 
the natural virtues, with a focus on Hume’s explanation of the origin of these virtues. The easiest 
way to understand Hume’s natural virtues is to combine Hume’s notion of natural with his 
already presented notion of virtue. The natural virtues then, are those character traits in which 
any normally functioning human being would, after a disinterested contemplation, naturally 
approve of with a sense of approbation. Likewise they are also those character traits that humans 
naturally approve of when present within themselves, and are naturally motivated to act in 
accordance with.
6
 This means that when considering the natural virtues, no reference or 
connection to any social convention or necessity will ever need to be made. One important 
distinction, which may aid in furthering the current explanation, can be seen in Hume’s initial 
claims concerning what natural is not, as was presented above. Hume claims that we cannot 
understand natural as opposed to rare or unusual, because, Hume believes, we can easily see the 
universality of human sentiment, and thus know that the approbation or disapprobation we feel 
whenever making moral distinctions is far from rare. Hume goes as far to say, “these sentiments 
                                                             
6 One important aspect of Hume’s view of the natural virtues is his distinction, or lack thereof, between natural 
virtues, and natural abilities. Ultimately Hume concludes that although there are differences between some natural 
abilities, and natural virtues, these differences are no greater than the differences among specific natural virtues. We 
approve of natural abilities in the same way we approve of natural virtues, and thus they are often considered 
together as natural virtues. This paper will not place a great importance on this distinction, and will instead proceed, 




are so rooted in our constitution and temper, that without entirely confounding the human mind 
by disease or madness, ’tis impossible to extirpate and destroy them” (Treatise 3.1.2.7). Here 
Hume is speaking of the sentiments of approbation and disapprobation we have towards certain 
character traits, and why a comparison of natural to what is rare or unusual would lend us little 
information, but this passage also sheds an important light on Hume’s conception of the natural 
virtues. These basic human sentiments which are rooted in our very constitution and temper are 
sufficient to explain the origin of the natural virtues, whereas they are merely necessary to 
explain the origin of the artificial virtues, as reference to some social convention or social need 
must also be cited. So, the natural virtues can be thought of as “original or inherent features of 
human nature” which all normal functioning humans are both disposed to have, and approve of 
(Norton I81). 
Hume exemplifies, and solidifies, the foundation of the natural virtues in human nature 
by comparing them with human appetites. Hume claims that like hunger, thirst, and other 
appetites, natural passions resulting from natural virtues such as resentment, love of life, and 
attachment to offspring “arise from a simple original instinct in the human breast which nature 
has implanted for like
7
 salutary purposes” (Enquiry 3.2.40).
8
 So, these inherent features of 
human nature, the natural virtues, should be thought of as the products of simple original 
instincts, or what can be thought of as an “innate capacity or predisposition” that a normally 
functioning human being has, in the same way that human hunger or thirst should be thought of 
in this way (Beauchamp 215). Thus, “natural virtues, then, are instinctive character traits of the 
agent which give rise to passions, which in turn motivate the will to action” (Fieser). So, we can 
                                                             
7 Here “like” means “like in the case of human appetites.” 
 
8 It should be noted that at this point in the text Hume is claiming that justice is an artificial virtue, because it is 
unlike the natural virtues in this way. A much more detailed account of Hume’s claims concerning the artificial 




understand the natural motivation to act in accordance with the natural virtues as a part of these 
human instincts. The natural virtues have “always motivated specific kinds of human behaviour” 
and will always continue to do so (Norton I81).     
Although in the treatise Hume does not give us an exhaustive list of the natural virtues, 
he does provide us with many of them, and we can elicit many more from the Enquiry. To 
uncover some of the natural virtues Hume “applies his scientific method… observing the kinds 
of acts which [naturally] elicit our approval, together with the character traits constantly 
conjoined with them” (Baillie 144). Thus, Hume is able to conclude that: generosity, humanity, 
compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality, and “all those other 
qualities, which form the character of good and benevolent” are some of the natural virtues 
(Treatise 3.3.3.3). In the Enquiry, although the natural-artificial distinction is not expressly 
present, we are able to elicit a similar list of natural virtues, again under the heading of 
benevolence (Enquiry 2.1.1). Thus, for Hume, benevolence, like attachment to offspring is a 
natural virtue, which itself arises from a simple original instinct, which nature has imbedded 
within the human breast, and like the appetites of hunger or thirsts needs no defense to secure its 
origin in our human nature.   
As was discussed above, Hume claims “that our sense of every kind of virtue is not 
natural; but that there are some virtues, that produce pleasure and approbation by means of an 
artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and necessities of mankind” 
(Treatise 3.2.1.1). As we have already presented what ‘artificial' means above, we can simply, as 
we did with natural, combine this term with Hume’s understanding of virtue, to present Hume’s 
notion of the artificial virtues. Thus, the artificial virtues are those virtues, “that produce pleasure 




necessities of mankind,” (Treatise 3.2.1.1). Importantly, these are virtues which are not a part of 
the fundamental fiber of human existence. Meaning these artificial virtues, unlike the natural 
virtues, are virtues which are not woven into our human constitution and temper, and are thus not 
products of simple original instincts found in human nature. Instead “artificial virtues are 
intentions which hold out an artificially instilled prospect of pleasure or pain; these evoke 
passions which in turn motivate willful actions” (Fieser). 
So, being a normally functioning human being is not enough to assure a sentiment of 
approbation towards a character trait resulting from an artificial virtue, as it was when 
considering the natural virtues. Instead, artificial virtues are products of human existence, or 
what can be thought of as a result or contrivance of the necessities this existence might entail. A 
specific example of such a necessity will be examined when Hume’s notion of justice is 
presented below, but broadly speaking, an artificial virtue arises due to a particular circumstance 
as a solution to some problem said circumstance entails. As Hume claims, if the “necessity” for 
these virtues did not exist, the virtues themselves would not exist (Treatise 3.2.1.1). The very 
existence of the artificial virtues depends on the necessities resulting from the circumstances of 
mankind. With his conception of the artificial virtues, Hume is clearly committed to the claim 
that these artificial virtues have no original permanent basing or fixture within human nature. If a 
particular problem or necessity never existed, the corresponding artificial virtue would have 
never existed. As James Baillie explains, “the very existence of the artificial virtues rests on 
various contingencies of the human condition, such as a limited and uncertain supply of material 
goods requisite for our wants and needs” (Baillie 154). 
It should be noted that our sentiments of approbation towards the artificial virtues, once 




only difference in the case of the artificial virtues, as opposed to the natural virtues, is that the 
moral sentiments of approbation towards artificial virtues depend, completely, on the needs and 
necessities which the circumstances of human existence dictate, and are not, as they are in the 
case of the natural virtues, an inseparable part of human nature. “After [an artificial virtue] is 
once establish’d by these conventions, it is naturally attended with a strong sentiment of morals” 
(Treatise 3.3.1.12). But, importantly it must first be established. 
To utilize an analogy to aid in this specific distinction, take the taste of an apple. 
Consider how, to many, the taste of an apple is pleasing, possibly even naturally pleasing. Now 
consider the taste of artificial apple flavoring. That taste (assuming the taste of the apple was 
pleasing and that the artificial flavoring is of a high quality, meaning it resembles the taste of an 
apple in a realistic manner) is also pleasing, and the pleasure one derives from that artificial 
flavoring is not artificial pleasure, but is instead pleasure which depends on an artifice. Although 
this analogy is far from perfect for the entirety of the natural virtue-artificial virtue distinction, it 
does, I believe, aid in clarifying what is sometimes called the inherently natural features of the 
artificial virtues, namely the pleasure they cause once they arise as artificial coping mechanisms 
to the needs and necessities of mankind.  
It should be noted that although initially it may appear as if the term artificial is intended 
to maintain some negative connotation, consequently giving a second-rate status to virtues of this 
type, that is not in any way Hume’s intention. When considering this distinction in virtue Hume 
clarifies that, “I make use of the word, natural, only as oppos’d to artificial,” (Treatise 3.2.2.19). 
Baillie articulates this commitment by assuring that Hume’s use of ‘artificial’ is as “a purely 
descriptive term, with no pejorative connotations” (Baillie 153). Meaning virtues which are 




Simply put, Hume believes that these are two equal, but different, types of virtue, which have 
drastically different origins. Although a minor point, this is an important one, because it is 
essential that the current project of this work not be understood as an attempt to save justice from 
an undesirable fate, trapped within the category of artificial virtues. Instead, I merely hope to 
show that there are good reasons to believe that justice should be understood as one of the 
natural virtues. 
Section II: The Artificial Virtue of Justice 
Justice is certainly the most prominent, and arguably the most important, instantiation of 
an artificial virtue which Hume directly discusses, although there are other very important 
artificial virtues, such as fidelity to promises and allegiance to one’s government. For Hume, the 
term justice may carry a slightly different, albeit simpler, meaning then one is accustomed to. 
Justice, holds Hume, is honesty with respect to property, or material honesty. Thus, to 
understand Hume’s conception of justice it is very important to understand Hume’s conception 
of property (although property, for Hume, holds a much more standard meaning). “What is a 
man’s property?  Any thing, which it is lawful for him, and for him alone, to use” (Enquiry 
3.2.35). There is one aspect of this definition which does require some specificity, which is, 
under Hume’s conception of property, it is only material or external goods that one can have and 
use which entail property. Throughout the Treatise and the Enquiry Hume refers to property 
exclusively as external goods (Treatise 3.2.2.9). Although a minor point, it is important to keep 
in mind, as I believe Hume’s concept of property, and the one presented in the second chapter of 
this work, will not concern instances of intellectual property, or anything of that type. This will 
become more important, when, in chapter two of the current work, a slightly altered conception 




offspring, external goods are the object of justice. Importantly, as will be discussed in more 
detail in the second chapter of this work, Hume holds that our conception of property, like our 
concept of the virtue of justice, arises out of the needs and necessities of mankind, as the 
artificial virtues do, and is not based in human nature, as our simple original instincts are.  
The first example of a situation involving the virtue of justice that Hume offers is a case 
in which a sum of money is borrowed, under the express condition that it will be returned in full 
to the lender in a few days. Hume claims that if the loan goes unpaid, causing the lender to 
demand her money back, the borrower may ask himself “what reason or motive have I to restore 
the money?” (Treatise 3.2.1.9). Hume claims that one might be tempted to claim that one’s 
“regard to justice, and abhorrence of villainy and knavery, are sufficient reason[s]” to repay the 
loan (Treatise 3.2.1.9). Although this answer would be satisfactory in what Hume calls a 
“civiliz’d state,” it in actuality provides us with no information as to the origin of this virtue. 
Hume claims that it is an undoubted maxim “that no action can be virtuous, or morally good, 
unless there be in human nature some motive to produce it, distinct from the sense of its 
morality” (Treatise 3.2.1.7). For example, as was presented above, sighting a simple original 
instinct was sufficient to explain the origin of the natural virtues. So when one asks: “what 
reason do I have to be benevolent?” or “what reason do I have to care for my offspring?” the 
answer is clearly found by simply examining our instinctual human nature. Citing a regard to the 
virtue of justice would not be a motive distinct from the sense of its morality, and thus leaves us 
in a difficult position. We know that justice is indeed a virtue, as we have a sense of approbation 
towards character traits that produce just acts, but we seem to have a difficult time articulating 
our foundational reasons for acting justly without making reference to the virtue itself, and thus 




This might seem like an excellent place in which to introduce an instinct which could be 
responsible for character traits resulting in just acts, which we have an accompanying instinctual 
sense of approbation towards, but Hume believes this option is a nonstarter. 
As justice evidently tends to promote public utility and to support civil society, the 
sentiment of justice is either derived from our reflecting on that tendency, or like hunger, 
thirst, other appetites, resentment, love of life, attachment to offspring, and other 
passions, arises from a simple original instinct in the human breast which nature has 
implanted for like salutary purposes. If the latter be the case, it follows, that property, 
which is the object of justice, is also distinguished by a simple, original instinct, and is 
not ascertained by any argument or reflection. But who is there that ever heard of such an 
instinct? Or is this a subject, in which new discoveries can be made? We may as well 
expect to discover, in the body, new senses, which had before escaped the observation of 
all mankind (Enquiry 3.2.40).  
 
So, Hume obviously wants to reject the possibility of a natural origin of justice, by pointing out 
that the object of justice, property, has certainly not arisen from a simple original instinct found 
as an inseparable part of human nature. Instead Hume will argue that justice, and our concept of 
property, has arisen as a result of our reflection on the public utility justice offers, while 
understanding that this utility is in actuality a solution to the problems that specific needs and 
necessities have created for mankind. In the second chapter of this work the particular arguments 
Hume gives rejecting the possible instinctual origin of justice and property will be examined, and 
replied to. For the remaining portion of this chapter Hume’s explanation of how justice arose 
solely out of public utility will be presented.  
As Hume clearly rejects the place of justice within the natural virtues, he must, to 
confirm justice within the place of the artificial virtues, offer an account of the origin of justice 
which shows that it arose from the circumstances and necessities of mankind. To do this, he first 
proposes his observation that nature has loaded humans with, “numberless wants and 
necessities” but correspondingly with “slender means” with which to achieve these 




problem which mankind must face if these necessities are to be obtained. Simply put, if a group 
does not have the means to achieve their wants and necessities, then they will be unable to 
sustain their existence. To exemplify this problem, a point of comparison is utilized involving a 
creature, which is not faced with this obstacle, “The lion as a voracious and carnivorous animal, 
we shall easily discover him to be very necessitous; but if we turn our eye to his make and 
temper, his agility, his courage, his arms, and his force, we shall find, that his advantages hold 
proportion with his wants.” (Treatise 3.2.2.2). Hume offers this comparison to show that a lion is 
an animal that, like a human, has numerous wants and necessities, but unlike a human does not 
face the problem Hume has exposed: a deficiency in one’s proportion of advantages to wants. 
Since the lion does not face this problem, it likewise does not require any solution (i.e. it does 
not require any artificial conventions). Clearly, the second point of this comparison is to further 
Hume’s claim that a human does in fact require some artificial convention, if her advantages are 
to hold proportion to her wants and necessities. Otherwise the humans would simply be unable to 
achieve these countless wants and necessities, and thus would not be able to maintain any sort of 
sustainable existence 
Hume proposes that the solution which mankind has produced to compensate with said 
deficiency is the forming of society. Hume claims that “’tis by society alone he is able to supply 
his defects, and raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures” (Treatise 3.2.2.3). 
Hume holds this is the reason why humans have been able to maintain a very sustainable 
existence even with the initial problematic deficiency we face. He further claims that it is even 
the case that society has enabled humans to surpass their fellow-creatures due to their ability to 
“acquire superiority above them” (Treatise 3.2.2.3). Specifically, Hume asserts that once a part 




of advantages to necessities and wants (Treatise 3.2.2.3). Hume believes that the forming of 
society provides remedies for problems that humans would face if on their own, meaning living 
in small familial groups. These remedies are the results of “the conjunction of forces,” which 
enable “additional force, ability, and security” as beneficial products of society (Treatise 3.2.2.3). 
Therefore the forming of society becomes “advantageous” to its members (Treatise 3.2.2.3).
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Next, Hume argues once society is formed, its members will realize that “the principal 
disturbance in society arises from those goods, we call external, and from their looseness and 
easy transition from one person to another” (Treatise, 3.2.2.9). This means that the main trouble 
those in a society face is a lack of certainty when considering the stability of their possessions or 
property. For Hume, “the enjoyment of such possessions as we have acquir’d by our industry and 
good fortune,” are possessions which are “expos’d to the violence of others, and may be 
transferr’d without suffering any loss or alteration” (Treatise 3.2.2.7). This claim further explains 
the problem those in a society face by proposing that the vast majority of those possessions one 
can acquire are possessions which can be stolen with no negative affect on the possession itself. 
For example, if one has a sack of apples there will be no negative affect on the sack of apples if 
at some point it is stolen by another person. The thief will simply be able to enjoy all the benefits 
of obtaining a sack of apples that said apples would have provided its initial owner. 
This presents a serious problem for society because these possessions which can be stolen 
are in low supply and high demand. Importantly, Hume holds that this is always the case. As will 
be presented in more detail in the second chapter of this work, Hume assumes that these 
possessions, which will ultimately entail property, presupposes scarcity, thus if property is stolen 
                                                             
9 Although interesting, a more detailed discussion of the initial reasons for the forming of society are beyond the 
present scope of this work. Simply put, small familial groups are formed due to the natural attraction between the 
sexes. The forming of a society acts as remedy to problems these small familial groups face.  For more on this topic 




from you, then something which is scarce has been stolen from you. This is the case because, 
“there is not a sufficient quantity of them [possessions] to supply every one’s desires and 
necessities” (Treatise 3.2.2.7). Due to this possibility of losing desired and necessary 
possessions, humans must seek a solution so as to be able to maintain their existence. Hume 
believes that the solution that is reached is the social convention of justice. In its very essence 
Hume believes that the doctrine of ‘if you do not steal my possessions, I will not steal yours’ is at 
work.
10
 Hume thinks that this “convention enter’d into by all the members of the society” is able 
to, “bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in the 
peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry” (Treatise 3.2.2.9). This 
leads Hume to the conclusion “that public utility is the sole origin of justice” and consequently 
that justice, “as it is now understood, wou’d never have been dream’d of among rude and savage 
men”
11
 ((Enquiry 3.1) (Treatise 3.2.2.8)). By reaching this conclusion Hume is claiming that 
justice is not an inseparable aspect of the human existence, but instead is something which is the 
solution to a problem that humans have faced. Thus, Hume claims, justice is one of the artificial 
virtues. So, the only reason we approve of just character traits (or have a conception of property 
in general for that matter) and call the possession of such character traits virtuous is due to this 
artificial human convention. “Justice is certainly approv’d of for no other reason, than because it 
has a tendency to the public good: And the public good is indifferent to us, except so far as 
sympathy interests us in it” (Treatise 3.3.6.1). So, human sympathy enables us to feel the 
                                                             
10 Importantly this doctrine of ‘if you do not steal my possessions, I will not steal yours’ is not a promise, which is 
actually, thinks Hume, another artificial human convention. Instead this doctrine is really “an expression of 
conditional intention” (Cohon). 
 
11 In the second chapter of this work, what Hume really intends by “rude and savage men” will be presented. In 




pleasure public good creates, and we thus have a sense of approbation towards just character 
traits. 
Importantly, Hume does maintain that other virtues, natural and artificial alike, acquire 
much of their approval due to their tendency to produce public utility and our psychological 
function of sympathy (which enables us to have a sense of approbation towards such utility). But 
it is crucial to note that “whereas we approve of benevolent actions [meaning character traits] 
primarily because of their social utility, we approve systems of justice exclusively because of 
their social utility” (Beauchamp 209). Whereas a natural virtue like benevolence is approved of 
because of the public utility it entails, and because such character traits can be understood as 
originating from simple original instincts embedded within human nature, and artificial virtue 
like justice is approved of solely due to the public utility it creates, and is thus the result of an 
artificial human convention. 
As was presented above, it should lastly be again noted that Hume is not claiming that 
justice now holds some second rate status to the natural virtues. “These reflections are far from 
weakening the obligations of justice, or diminishing any thing from the most sacred attention to 
property” (Enquiry 3.2.39). Instead Hume holds that justice and our concept of property, are 
important and even necessary aspects of our social existence, but are not products of instincts 
















As was presented in the first chapter of this work, Hume clearly holds that just character 
traits, which we have a strong sense of approbation towards, and which comprise the virtue of 
justice, cannot arise from a simple original instinct embedded within human nature. So the virtue 
of justice is not an innate capacity or predisposition that normally functioning humans have 
merely by being normally functioning human beings. As was earlier presented, “Hume is 
denying that justice is, like benevolence, an original instinct” (Beauchamp 215). Hume believes 
we can quite easily come to this conclusion because if justice holds a place among the natural 
virtues, due to human instinct, then property, which is the sole object of justice, must also be 
distinguished, or known, by some simple original instinct which is an inseparable part of human 
nature. Hume believes this can quickly, and obviously, be rejected, “who is there that ever heard 
of such an instinct?” he says when considering the possibility of an instinct which distinguishes 
property (Enquiry 3.2.40).  
Hume goes as far to say that to expect to discover a property instinct, and 
correspondingly an instinct which gives rise to justice, would be equivalent to expecting “to 
discover, in the body, new senses, which has before escaped the observation of all mankind” 
(Enquiry 3.2.40). Mackie, among many others, agrees that Hume “is probably right” to reject an 
instinctual origin of our concept of property, and correspondingly an instinctual origin of the 
virtue of justice (82). This ultimately leads Hume to confidently place justice among the artificial 
virtues, which, as was previously presented, arise as an artificial solution to the problems the 




origin of justice, and that reflections on the beneficial consequences of this virtue are the sole 
foundation of its merit” (Enquiry 3.1.1).  
As Baillie points out, Hume dismisses the possibility of an instinctual origin of justice 
quickly in the Treatise, but spends a considerably larger amount of time rejecting this possibility 
in his later moral work, the Enquiry (155). Although Hume allows a longer path to be taken in 
the Enquiry he settles on the same position, justice cannot arise from a simple original instinct 
which is an inseparable part of human nature, and this should be obvious because property 
cannot be known via some simple original instinct. The current chapter of this work will 
challenge this claim, by examining the arguments Hume offers which reject an instinctual origin 
of property and thus justice, and offer objections to those arguments. A possible instinctual 
concept of property will be offered which I hold can avoid the major objections Hume has to an 
instinctual origin of our concept of property, and ultimately a natural origin of the virtue of 
justice.  
Section I: Hume’s Concept of Property 
Before the specific arguments Hume provides to reject the possibility of an instinctual 
origin of property, and thus justice, can be considered and responded to, Hume’s general 
conception of what property is must be offered in greater detail than it was in the first chapter of 
this work. This is especially important, because later in this chapter a possible conception of 
property, which I believe could arise from a simple original instinct, will be presented, and this 
concept of property will rely on the major tenets of Hume’s general understanding of property.
12
  
                                                             
12 I believe this is an important aspect of the current project, because to offer a concept of property which is 
unrecognizable compared to Hume’s understanding of property, could be, I believe, stacking the deck in favor of a 
natural origin of justice, thus I will attempt to offer an instinctual concept of property which Hume would still be 




As previously presented, Hume holds that external goods, which are lawful for some 
person, and that person alone to, keep and use, are things one can call their property (Enquiry 
3.2.35). Hume explains his use of lawful by asserting “our property is nothing but those goods, 
whose constant possession is establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice” 
(Treatise 3.2.2.11). Importantly, these ‘laws of justice’ which Hume refers to are those laws 
founded on the artificial virtue of justice. Thus, for Hume, our ability to distinguish property is 
itself a result of an artificial human convention, meaning it too arises out of the needs and 
necessities of mankind, and is not founded within human nature, as the natural virtues are. So 
without the artificial social convention of justice, we would have no concept of property. As 
Hume explains, “A man’s property is some object related to him. This relation is not natural, but 
moral, and founded on justice” (Treatise 3.2.2.11). From this understanding Hume is able to 
conclude that “The origin of justice explains that of property. The same artifice gives rise to 
both” (Treatise 3.2.2.11).  
So, as was presented in the first chapter of this work Hume is claiming that our concept 
of property arises, like justice, as a kind of artificial human convention which is meant to help 
humans attain requisite desires and necessities. As was previously presented, the uncertain and 
limited supply of external goods and necessities poses a problem for humans, and the virtue of 
justice and concept of property aid humans in limiting the difficulties resulting from this 
disadvantaged starting point. Without the artificial virtue of justice, we would have no 
conception of property and likewise without the artificial concept of property there would be no 
virtue of justice. “Hume maintains that the notion of property depends on the concept of justice 
because it is only as the conventions of justice are established that the notion of property 




cooperators, individuals signal to one another a willingness to conform to a simple rule: to 
refrain from the material goods others come to possess by labor or good fortune, provided those 
others will observe the same restraint toward them” and thus, as was presented above, the 
artificial virtue of justice arises, and correspondingly our artificial concept of property (Cohon). 
To further this claim Hume utilizes the idea of pre-societal humans, meaning humans 
who are in small familial groups which are not a part of any larger community, and claims that in 
this “rude and savage” state neither justice nor a concept of property would be understood 
(Treatise 3.2.2.8). Importantly, the time of pre-societal humans need not, for my purposes or 
Hume’s, have been an actual state of existence for any real length of time in human history. 
Instead, one only needs to be able to contemplate the possibility of pre-societal humans, because 
doing so should enable one to see which virtues remain, natural virtues arising from simple 
original instincts, which are themselves inseparable parts of human nature and which virtues 
would disappear, those which can only arise from societal convention. As Baillie explains 
Hume’s claim “it is not that a pre-societal person would find any appeal to justice unintelligible 
when he asks why he should keep his promise to return someone else’s property. Rather, the very 
ideas of property and promising would be equally unintelligible to him, since they come into 
existence only as a result of human convention” (155). So, the pre-societal human would have no 
understanding of property at all. A simple question such as: “is this my apple or is this your 
apple?” would, under this theory, be unintelligible. There would be, in this state of unrestricted 
nature, as Hume calls it, no concepts of ‘mine’ or ‘yours,’ because “the objects [external goods] 
which receive those appellations, are, of themselves, foreign to us, they are totally disjoined and 





Thus, external goods, ownership of which can only be understood once the artificial 
human convention of justice is understood, initially comprise Hume’s concept of property. There 
is, however, another very important aspect of Hume’s concept of property. This aspect concerns 
scarcity. For Hume, ownership of property entails scarcity. This means without the scarcity of 
some external good there can be no concept of ownership of that good, meaning if some type of 
good is not scarce, then that type of good cannot be property of anyone. “We see, even in the 
present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an 
unlimited abundance, we leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no 
subdivisions of right and property” (Enquiry 3.1.4). Hume uses the examples of water and air to 
exemplify this point. “Water and air, though the most necessary of all objects, are not challenged 
as the property of individuals; nor can any man commit injustice by the most lavish use and 
enjoyment of these blessings” (Enquiry 3.1.4). Hume even claims that in some “fertile extensive 
countries” land is in such abundance that it cannot be considered property (Enquiry 3.1.4). Hume 
does leave open the possibility “in some countries, at some periods, that there be established a 
property in water, and none in land; if the latter be in greater abundance than can be used by the 
inhabitants, and former be found, with difficult, and in very small quantities” (Enquiry 3.1.5).
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So, Hume holds, that even once the artificial human convention brings the concept of property 
into existence, it still only pertains to those external objects which are scarce. 
Hume considers a fictional instantiation of human existence to exemplify his claim 
concerning scarcity, ultimately concluding that scarcity is necessary for a concept of property to 
exist, and thus scarcity is necessary for the virtue of justice to exist. “Let us suppose, that nature 
                                                             
13 Importantly, I believe that Hume’s disclaimer here enables him to avoid modern objections which call into 
question the factuality of his claim concerning water and air. For example, the fact that water is, now, almost always 
understood as property or even a more abstract objection in which air is considered to be one’s property, possibly in 




has bestowed on the human race such profuse abundance of all external conveniencies, that, 
without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our part, every individual 
finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites can want, or luxurious 
imagination wish or desire” (Enquiry 3.1.3). In this “happy state,” as Hume calls it, there would 
be no concept of property and correspondingly no need for the virtue of justice at all. To prove 
this point Hume poses some rhetorical questions concerning the role property would play within 
such a state of human existence: “for what purpose make a partition of goods, where every one 
has already more than enough? Why give rise to property, where there cannot possibly be any 
injury? Why call this object mine, when, upon the seizing of it by another, I need but stretch out 
my hand to possess myself of what is equally valuable?” (Enquiry 3.1.3). Hume holds that even 
the poets imagined such a fictional instantiation of human existence “in their descriptions of the 
felicity, attending the golden age or the reign of Saturn” (Enquiry 3.1.14).
14
 Hume points out that 
as he had, the poets too found no need for a mine/your distinction
15
, concept of property, or 
virtue of justice in such a state of overabundance, “Even the punctilious distinction of mine and 
thine was banished from among the happy race of mortals, and carried with it the very notion of 
property and obligation, justice and injustice” (Enquiry 3.1.14). 
Hume holds that by using this thought experiment one can see, that there would be no 
mine/your distinction because there would be an unlimited supply of desired and necessary 
external goods. With no mine/your distinction there would be no concept of property in such a 
happy state, and with no concept of property there would be no virtue of justice. The human 
convention of justice would no longer be needed, because, as Hume claims, there could be no 
                                                             
14  As Beauchamp describes Hume’s reference to the Golden Age: “the reference is to the ancient legend that an 
ideal period existed on earth during the reign of Saturn (Greek Cronus)” (Beauchamp 210). 
 
15 I am assuming that Hume intended this to mean “no use for a mine/your distinction concerning external goods.” I 




injury involving the seizing of another’s goods. Essentially Hume is claiming that without 
scarcity the need for a concept of property would have never come into existence, and so too the 
human convention that is the virtue of justice would have never come into existence. Justice in 
such a state of human existence as this would be totally and completely useless, making it an 
“idle ceremonial” which “could never possibly have place in the catalogue of virtues” (Enquiry 
3.1.3). 
At this point it is now possible to present a general understanding of what Hume’s 
concept of property entails. It is, like justice, a human convention, which allows members of a 
society to alone have a right to use and keep some external good. Importantly, Hume holds that 
only scarce external goods, meaning those in a limited and uncertain supply, can be one’s 
property. Thus, though Hume spends the majority of his time offering an example in which all 
external goods are overabundant, Hume holds that even in our current necessitous condition 
external goods like water or air, or any external good which nature has provided an unlimited 
supply of, cannot be understood as one’s property. 
Section II: Hume on the Artificial Origin of Our Concept of Property 
Now that Hume’s general conception of property has been presented, it is possible to 
present why Hume holds that this general concept of property cannot arise from a simple original 
instinct embedded within human nature, which in turn will show why Hume believes that the 
virtue of justice cannot hold a place among the natural virtues. As was presented above, Hume 
claims that our concept of property, like our concept of the virtue of justice, arose from an 
artificial human convention, and not a simple original instinct. Hume offers three thought 
experiments which concern fictional instantiations of human existence which are supposed to 




concept of property, and thus the virtue of justice, concluding that this is evidence against a 
natural origin. Hume also offers an argument which concerns our particular rules, laws and 
human conventions concerning property, and claims that our concept of property is too complex 
to have arisen from a simple original instinct. The remainder of this chapter will present these 
arguments Hume offers to reject an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice, 
and then respond to each of them in an attempt to show that Hume was wrong to claim an 
instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice are not possible. 
The first of these three fictional instantiations of human existence is the “happy state” of 
overabundance of all external goods, which was presented in Section I. In this happy state, as 
presented above, Hume claims that with an overabundance of all necessary and desired external 
goods no concept of property would have ever existed, and thus no virtue of justice would have 
ever existed. Hume holds that this provides proof of the artificial origin of our concept of 
property and virtue of justice because in this happy state of overabundance the natural virtues 
would not vanish.
16
 When considering this state Hume claims “it seems evident, that, in such a 
happy state, every other social virtue would flourish, and receive tenfold increase; but the 
cautious, jealous virtue of justice would never once have been dreamed of” (Enquiry 3.1.3). 
Hume often uses the phrase “social virtues” to refer to benevolence and justice, and as justice is 
excluded by the “every other,” meaning every other social virtue besides justice, we know Hume 
is referring to benevolence. Benevolence, which as was presented in chapter one when the 
natural virtues were presented, is the term Hume uses to describe, in the Treatise, such natural 
virtues as: generosity, humanity, compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, 
                                                             
16 This, although not explicitly stated, can, I believe, be elicited from the text of the Enquiry. The reason this has to 
be elicited from the text, and is not, instead, directly stated by Hume is because as was presented in the first chapter 
of this work Hume does not use the actual words ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ in the Enquiry. However I hold, as do 




disinterestedness, liberality, and “all those other qualities, which form the character of good and 
benevolent” (Treatise 3.3.3.3). Hume offers a very similar list of virtues under the heading of 
benevolence in the Enquiry: sociable, good-natured, humane, merciful, grateful, friendly, 
generous, beneficent, “or their equivalents” (Enquiry 2.1.1). In the Enquiry Hume even states 
that these virtues “or their equivalents, are known in all languages, and universally express the 
highest merit, which human nature is capable of attaining,” showing his continued commitment 
to the foundation of benevolence within human nature (i.e. firmly categorizing them under the 
heading of the natural virtues). Thus, Hume believes that this happy state of overabundance 
shows an instantiation of human existence, in which the artificial virtue of justice would have 
never been actualized, because there would be no concept of property, but importantly the 
natural virtue of benevolence would indeed still be present.  
Hume’s claim concerning the resilience of the natural virtues in a happy state of 
overabundance is clearly supported by Hume’s understanding of what these natural virtues are. 
These natural virtues are inseparable aspects of human nature, which originate from human 
instinct, thus it seems evident that simply imagining humans in a fictitious state of 
overabundance could not eliminate them. To take another natural virtue, such as caring for one’s 
offspring, we can clearly see that imagining humans in a state of overabundance would not cause 
this virtue to vanish. Thus, Hume is arguing that unlike in the case of our concept of property and 
virtue of justice we cannot easily imagine a situation in which the natural virtues would become 
useless and vanish. 
Hume offers two more fictional instantiations of human existence, which are also 
intended to further Hume’s claim that our concept of property and virtue of justice are human 




they are not the result of human instinct. In the first of these two alternatives to human existence 
Hume asks us to “suppose, that, though the necessities of human race continue the same as at 
present, yet the mind is so enlarged, and so replete with friendship and generosity, that every 
man has the utmost tenderness for every man, and feels no more concern for his own interest 
than for that of his fellows” (Enquiry 3.1.6). Given this greatly enlarged capacity for 
benevolence Hume holds that “it seems evident, that the use of justice would, in this case, be 
suspended by such an extensive benevolence, nor would the divisions and barriers of property 
and obligation have ever been thought of” (Enquiry 3.1.6). Hume claims that given this extreme 
benevolence “the whole human race would form only one family, where all would lie in 
common” meaning everything would be communally shared, and “be used freely, without regard 
to property” (Enquiry 3.1.6). Hume holds this to be the case because such inflated benevolence 
would have each of us treat each of our fellow humans in the same way we would treat 
ourselves. We would hold a “regard to the necessities of each individual, as if our own interests 
were most intimately concerned” (Enquiry 3.1.6).  
Although initially this may seem like a rather incomprehensible idea, Hume claims that 
such benevolence is not as farfetched as one might think. Hume offers the real life examples of 
families, and married couples. In these cases he holds that, although the benevolence is not as 
enlarged as it is in the fictitious state described above, “the stronger the mutual benevolence is 
among the individuals, the nearer it approaches [the perfect benevolence described above]; till all 
distinction of property be, in a great measure, lost and confounded among them” (Enquiry 3.1.7). 
Hume even points out that in the case of married couples, the law even reflects this fading 
distinction of property, “the cement of friendship is by the laws supposed so strong as to abolish 




The second of these latter two alternatives to human existence which Hume intends to 
further demonstrate the artificial foundation of justice and property, concerns imagining the 
opposite to the limitless abundance Hume first describes. Hume imagines a situation in which a 
society falls into extreme “want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry 
cannot preserve the greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery” 
(Enquiry 3.1.8). Hume claims that in such a situation “that the strict laws of justice are 
suspended” and likewise our concept of property would dissolve (Enquiry 3.1.8). “Is it any 
crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, 
without regard to former limitations of property?” (Enquiry 3.1.8). Similarly, Hume believes that 
this kind of situation can be observed even if we only consider one person to “fall into the 
society of ruffians” who have no “protection of laws and government” (Enquiry 3.1.9). In both 
situations Hume holds that our virtue of justice and concept of property would be useless and 
thus melt away, again showing that these do not belong to the category of natural virtues, which 
are inseparable aspects of human nature.  
Hume concludes that these three thought experiments concerning fictional instantiations 
of human existence are able to provide evidence that his artificial categorization of our concept 
of property and virtue of justice are correct. Hume holds that by showing the possibility of this 
convention and virtue disappearing given specific fictional situations humans, or a society, are 
placed in he has provided evidence for their placement within human convention. This shows, 
thinks Hume, that unlike the natural virtues, our virtue of justice cannot be an inseparable part of 
human nature, because our concept of property cannot arise from a simple original instinct 
embedded within human nature, as alterations in the structure of human existents cause such a 




breast perfect moderation and humanity, or perfect rapaciousness and malice” and, as was 
shown, we will eliminate our concern for, or even understanding of, the concept of property 
(Enquiry 3.1.12). Thus by eliminating our concept of property we are “rendering justice totally 
useless… thereby totally destroy[ing] its essence, and suspend[ing] its obligation upon mankind” 
(Enquiry 3.1.12).  
Section III: The Artificial Origin of Our Concept of Property Reconsidered 
 
Ultimately I believe that the three thought experiments which concern fictional 
instantiations of human existence that Hume offers to show that a general concept of property, 
and thus the virtue of justice, cannot be the result of a simple original instinct, and must be the 
result of artificial human convention, fail. First, I believe a strong objection to these three 
counterfactuals can be found in their factual distance from reality. I believe that most would 
agree, as even Hume does himself, that none of these three fictional states of human existence 
are close to representing reality. Hume even claims that “the common situation of society is a 
medium amidst all these extremes” (Enquiry 3.1.13).  
Although I know that this objection seems not only weak, but to miss the point of 
Hume’s argumentation altogether, I think it is important. I believe it is especially important 
concerning the second of the three alternate realities which Hume offers, greatly enlarged 
benevolence. I think it is rather important to note that such benevolence is not only unrealistic, 
but considering humans’ actual benevolence, unnatural. As Hume notes several times throughout 
his moral writings, our sympathy is partial to ourselves in that we sympathize with those closer 
to us to a greater extent than with those far removed. Meaning we feel pain and pleasures more 
greatly when considering vice and virtue which affects us or those we are close to, then we do 




that we must make moral distinctions from a disinterested point of view to assure that variations 
in our sympathy do not result in like variations in our moral distinctions. That is not to say that 
we ought to discount the natural virtue of benevolence, but using a fictional state of perfect 
benevolence seems to be stacking the deck against the possibility of a natural origin of property, 
and thus justice.  
 To make this objection clear, consider an alternate reality in which only friendship is 
greatly enlarged in the human breast instead of all of the virtues under the heading of 
benevolence. In such a society all would have the perfect virtue of friendship, and, as Hume 
describes when considering enlarged benevolence in general, there would most likely be no 
concept of property in this society either, and thus no virtue of justice, because there would be no 
distinctions of ‘mine’ and ‘yours’. This would be the case because this perfect friendship would 
have each of us treat others as a “second self”
17
 (Enquiry 3.1.6) Importantly, though, when all in 
a society are treating each other in the same way they treat themselves I believe that our concept 
of property, and thus virtue of justice would not be the only virtue to disappear. I believe that 
clearly disinterestedness would in fact disappear, as it too would be completely useless. In what 
way could we be self-interested when our perfect virtue of friendship already entails treating all 
others as we treat ourselves? The very concept of self-interests seems likely to vanish from a 
society with such an enlarged virtue of friendship. Likewise, I think fidelity, would likely, also 
disappear as being faithful seems to entail the possibility of treating others differently than we 
treat ourselves. For example, I am unsure how a situation could arise in which one is unfaithful 
to one’s self. 
                                                             
17 It should be noted that I am assuming, as Beauchamp does, that by “second self” Hume is falling in line with 
Aristotle’s theory that friendship between virtuous people “entails a mutual concern for the other’s good; a friend 




When Hume initially presents the notion of enlarged benevolence, because so many 
virtues are included under that heading, and they are all considered to be enlarged at once, it is 
easy only to see how such benevolence could eliminate our concept of property, and thus the 
virtue of justice. But by separating off just the virtue of friendship, and considering what a 
greatly enlarged virtue of friendship would entail, I think it is easy to see that such enlarged 
friendship would eliminate not only our concept of property, but also other natural virtues. 
Ultimately, this objection is not intended to show that because we can imagine a scenario 
in which a greatly enlarged virtue of friendship can eliminate the usefulness of the natural virtues 
of disinterestedness and fidelity we ought to remove disinterestedness and fidelity from the 
catalogue of natural virtues. Instead I hope this objection highlights the problem with using 
unrealistic and unnatural enlarged versions of the natural virtues to exclude the place of other 
virtues in the catalogue of natural virtues. Simply put, I agree that exaggerated benevolence 
could eliminate the usefulness of our concept of property, and thereby dissolve the virtue of 
justice, but I believe it must also be accepted that such a method, of imagining such exaggerated 
virtues, could also be used to show that we can eliminate the usefulness of other natural virtues, 
causing them to likewise dissolve. Thus, the fact that greatly enlarged benevolence may show an 
imaginary instance, in which property and justice disappear, does not, itself, provide a sufficient 
reason to reject the possibility of an instinctual origin of property, and a natural origin of justice.  
Likewise to implant “perfect rapaciousness and malice”
18
 would too, I think, be stacking 
the deck in the same way (Enquiry 3.1.12). Humans are not perfectly malevolent, in actuality, 
even Hume presents an almost opposite picture of human nature by placing benevolence in the 
category of natural virtues. Such perfect maleficence would, like perfect friendship, eliminate the 
                                                             
18 Hume seems to mention this objection to the natural origin of property and justice in passing. I do not think that it 
is equivalent to the third objection Hume offers presented above, concerning the opposite of the happy state of 




possibility of many of the natural virtues which we know Hume holds are based in instinct. For 
example, all of the virtues under the heading of benevolence would be useless to a perfectly 
maleficent society (if such a thing can even be imagined). So, I again agree that Hume is correct 
to claim that perfect maleficence would cause our concept of property and virtue of justice to 
disappear, but it would have an equal effect on many of the natural virtues, like all of those 
virtues under the heading of benevolence.
19
 
Accordingly, I think that it is important to consider again the fact that, although 
interesting, both Hume’s initial arguments, concerning greatly enlarged benevolence, 
maleficence, and my objection to his argument which utilizes greatly enlarged friendship do not 
give sufficient credit to the fact that these greatly enlarged virtues do not in actuality exist. 
Although, I understand that this appears to be a simple and hasty objection to Hume’s argument 
concerning enlarged benevolence and maleficence, I do think it is important. I believe that many 
real natural instincts could be shown to be unnecessary, and thus disappear, if we allow ourselves 
the unchecked use of imaginary aids, as was shown above with the natural virtues of 
disinterestedness and fidelity, and benevolence as a whole. To consider another example of an 
unrealistic imaginary aid being used to dissolve a natural virtue which has arisen from an 
instinct, consider a society in which the vast majority of members have never had children. 
Although the need for an imaginary premise which closely resembles some dystopian science 
fiction would be needed to imagine such a society, I do not think that it is much more farfetched 
then imagining a society in which all members are perfectly benevolent or maleficent. For 
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 It should be noted that Dr. Matthew Hickey, while commenting on this work, pointed out that a perfectly 
maleficent society may not necessarily exclude a concept of property when limited to “my external goods.” 
Importantly though, I do hold that the second half of the concept of property which Hume presents, namely the 
“your external goods,” when considering the “mine/yours” distinction, would not be present in such a perfectly 
maleficent society, as the conception of “your external goods” does not seem possible for members of such a 
society. Without this second half of the concept of property, an understanding of “your external goods,” any virtue 




example, consider a society in which only a small group of people are responsible for having and 
raising all offspring and all other members who make up the vast majority of the society are in 
no way apart of this process or even aware of the specifics of the process. In such a society 
would the natural virtue to care for one’s offspring still be useful to the majority of the society’s 
members? I think not, and I think such a virtue would appear to disappear, like that of the virtue 
of justice, and our concept of property, in Hume’s perfectly benevolent or maleficent society. It 
is important to consider that Hume holds that like all the natural virtues, the natural virtue to care 
for one’s offspring arises from a simple original instinct within human nature. So, it seems 
impossible to conclude that this inseparable part of human nature could disappear by merely 
changing the structure of a society. Thus, I think it is more appropriate to conclude that the use of 
unrealistic imaginary aids, in which fundamental facts of our existence are changed, should not 
be utilized as sufficient evidence to reject the natural origin of justice, or any virtue for that 
matter. 
It should be noted that Hume holds that we can observe partial instances of this enlarged 
benevolence in married couples and families. Although I agree with Hume that these real life 
situations do, in some (or even most) cases embody instances of greater than normal or average 
benevolence, they do not, I think, come that close to the greatly enlarged benevolence (seeing 
others as a second self) Hume needs to completely dissolve our concept of property and virtue of 
justice. In my experience with family, I certainly have evidence to show that a concept of 
property did exist in my family home. Although I am speaking from a very limited prospective, I 
assume most members of a family household consider external goods like “my room” or “my 
bed” or even “my toy” to be their property. Likewise, I would imagine that married couples still 




even “my side of the bed.” Even allowing that the law, as Hume points out, diminishes the legal 
property distinction between married couples it is significant to note that a property concept 
seems to still exist in some form. Although, it is important to note that this last instance of 
property, “my side of the bed,” represents an external good and concept of property, which 
differs from Hume’s conception presented above, and must be argued for at length below. It is 
also important to note that Hume could argue that although I have pointed to instances of use of a 
concept of property at work within families and married couples that is merely a result of an 
artificial social convention which spills over, from the larger society, of which any particular 
family, or married couple is a part of. For this reason, to avoid this objection, I would like to next 
consider the happy state of overabundance Hume considers, in which Hume holds a concept of 
property and virtue of justice could have never arisen.  
I hold that in this happy state of overabundance, there would still be a concept of 
property, and a virtue of justice. Although I believe that this concept of property is indeed 
fundamentally different than the one Hume introduces, I do not think that it abandons the major 
tenets of Hume’s concept of property. This meaning I will still consider external goods, as Hume 
does, as the sole object of property, and importantly will argue as Hume does that property does 
presuppose scarcity, albeit scarcity understood slightly differently than Hume understands it. I 
will attempt to present this concept of property within Hume’s happy state by presenting, what I 
hold to be, a realistic, and ultimately unavoidable, mine/your distinction within this fictional state 
of human existence. As was argued above concerning the fictional states of enlarge benevolence 
and maleficence, I believe one could claim that such a happy state of overabundance is another 
impossible state of human existence, and should thus be rejected as evidence against the natural 




maleficence were. Although, this is one objection to Hume’s claim concerning this happy state, I 
actually hold that this fictional state of human existence requires further contemplation. 
Although a state of absolute overabundance is indeed impossible, it does not seem as far-fetched 
as a state of perfect benevolence or maleficence. Hume notes, and I agree, that there exists, 
concerning specific external goods in our current necessitous state, a similar scenario as his 
proposed state of overabundance. 
Consider, again, the happy state of overabundance which Hume introduces. “Let us 
suppose, that nature has bestowed on the human race such profuse abundance of all external 
conveniencies, that, without any uncertainty in the event, without any care or industry on our 
part, every individual finds himself fully provided with whatever his most voracious appetites 
can want, or luxurious imagination wish or desire” (Enquiry 3.1.3). In this state Hume claims we 
would have no need to call some external object mine “when, upon the seizing of it by another, I 
need but stretch out my hand to possess myself of what is equally valuable” (Enquiry 3.1.3). 
Without any alteration to this fictional scenario, which Hume presents, I believe we can, if we 
consider this state in rather great detail, find a concept of property which is in use by the 
inhabitants of such a happy state, by showing the use of, and understanding of, a mine/your 
distinction. Although more work will need to be done to prove that this concept of property 
arises from a natural instinct and is embedded within human nature, the venture at present will be 
to show that even in such a happy state a concept of property, could, and I believe would, exist. 
Consider a scenario in which Smith, a member of this society in such a happy state, sits 
under the same tree at the same time every day to read, and has done so for several years, and is 
known to do so by all other members of this society. Now imagine one day when Smith reaches 




way beyond the scope of what I would consider realistic, to suppose that Smith, finding himself 
in this scenario, would tell Jones, “you are in my reading spot” and possibly ask, or even tell 
Jones to move. It is also possible, and equally as effective for my purposes, if Smith merely 
thinks “Jones is in my reading spot.” Importantly, I am not claiming at this point that Jones, in 
this scenario, would move, or would even feel that he should move, but am instead trying to 
introduce what seems to me to be a rather realistic use of a mine/your distinction in this happy 
state of overabundance. Even if there were an unlimited amount of other trees under which Smith 
could read, I think that Smith would still feel that his reading spot had been taken by Jones. Of 
course my use of “his” is not an attempt to sneak a mine/your distinction into this scenario, but 
instead the only way I can think of to describe what I believe Smith would feel, upon finding 
Jones in the spot in which he regularly inhabits. If Smith feels this way, then it is a clear 
indication of an understanding of a mine/yours distinction in Hume’s happy state of 
overabundance. Importantly, even if Jones claimed: “this is not your reading spot” in response to 
Smith, this too would be a clear indication of a mine/your distinction.  
 It might be helpful to introduce a similar use of the mine/your distinction concerning the 
ownership of external goods which I believe is at play in our current necessitous state, if only to 
provide a real account as backing to what I am proposing would exists in Hume’s state of 
overabundance. I have often observed in small classrooms a similar mine/your distinction as the 
one above described with Smith and Jones. Consider a student who has sat at the same desk, or at 
least the same seating area, in a small classroom, which has more than enough desks for 
everyone, all semester, two or three days a week. Now imagine this student arrives to class on a 
particular day to find that another student has sat in her seat at her desk. I believe it is important 




student claimed or even thought: “someone took my seat.” This is significant because as in 
Hume’s happy state, there are other desks the first student could sit at, and these other desks are 
almost always the same make, model, and even quality as her desk. This relates to the happy 
state of overabundance because, Hume claims that even in our current necessitous state those 
external objects which are in an abundant supply, like desks in a classroom with more than 
enough seats for everyone, are objects that cannot be one’s property, and cannot be understood in 
relation to a mine/your distinction.  
One might object to this mine/your distinction which I have presented as a possibility in 
Hume’s happy state, by claiming that this example of a mine/your distinction, concerning Smith 
and Jones and the ownership of an external good, has been imported from an observation from a 
society in which a concept of property already exists, and is in use
20
 (as in the classroom 
example), and hold that in actuality Smith would never say or think “Jones is in my reading 
spot,” and would instead simply go sit under another tree. I would like to respond with a further 
example of such a distinction I believe would exists in such a happy state, and which I hold is 
much harder to dismiss by claiming it would not in actuality occur in such a state. Although I 
hold this next example is harder to completely dismiss, it is important to note that ultimately I am 
merely attempting to show that a mine/your distinction could be present in the fictional 
instantiation of human existence in which Hume believes such a distinction is impossible.  
In this next scenario imagine that Smith is sitting in a particular location which is merely 
one of the many identical locations throughout this society in a state of overabundance, and one 
that Smith chose randomly which he has never before utilized. Smith has been sitting in this 
particular location for several hours, when Jones approaches Smith, and asks him to stand. Now 
                                                             
20 A much more entailed response to an objection to my general concept of property which includes a claim that I 




consider that Smith complies, for whatever reason, and stands, only to watch Jones sit in the 
particular location Smith was sitting in just before he stood. I believe that Smith would feel that 
Jones had taken his sitting spot. Meaning he would think: “Jones just took my sitting spot.” If for 
whatever reason, Jones asking Smith to stand seems unrealistic, I believe there would be no 
problem instead considering a similar scenario in which Jones physically moves Smith, and then 
sits where Smith had just been sitting.  
As was presented above this mine/your distinction concerning the ownership of external 
goods, which I believe the above two examples have at least shown the possibility of in Hume’s 
happy state of overabundance, is only possible if there is an underlying concept of property at 
work, which is comprehended by those using or even understanding such a distinction. Hume 
supports this claim when presenting the impossibility of a concept of property in the happy state 
by using as a premise the claim that there would be no mine/your distinction, and thus 
concluding that no concept of property would exists in such a state (Enquiry 3.1.3). Thus, if in 
any of these examples, given above, in which Smith feels that Jones has taken his reading spot, 
or sitting spot, then Smith must have a working understanding of a mine/your distinction, and 
thus have a concept of property which is enabling him to make this distinction.
21
  
Importantly, Hume’s concept of property cannot be the concept of property which Smith 
is utilizing. This is because as was presented above, Hume holds that a person’s property is some 
external good, which is lawful for that person, and that person alone to keep and use (Enquiry 
3.2.35). The examples I have provided clearly show that if we accept that Smith has a concept of 
                                                             
21 Of course one objection which could be raised at this point would be to reject the claim that a mine/your 
distinction, concerning external goods, entails a concept of property. First, I am comfortable neglecting this 
objection, as I believe Hume does, and second, I agree with Hume that a mine/your distinction entails a concept of 
property. I do not think it is possible for one to have a mine/your distinction without a concept of property. Simply 
put I am unsure how it would be possible to use and understand such a distinction without a working concept of 




property, then it cannot be equivalent to the concept Hume presents. The first major difference 
between Hume’s concept of property, and the concept of property which I hold Smith 
understands rests in the fact that this new concept of property does not entail that Smith is the 
sole owner of the spot he is sitting in, and he is the only person who has a right
22
 to or is 
permitted to use said spot. This should be rather obvious if we consider the last scenario I 
presented above. In this scenario, I believe, Smith would feel that his spot had been taken from 
him by Jones, when upon being asked to stand up by Jones, Jones sat in the exact spot Smith had 
been occupying. I believe that most would agree that Smith does not feel that Jones took his 
sitting spot, because he, Smith, is the only person who ever has a right to sit there.
23
 Instead, I 
hold that the concept of property which Smith understands is much more temporally restricted. 
What I mean by ‘temporally restricted’ is that Smith’s concept of property entails that he owns 
the spot he is sitting in, meaning he is the only person who has a right to use it, but only at the 
time he is sitting in it, and does not own the sitting spot at other unrelated times. For example, if 
later in the day Smith walks by the spot he was sitting in earlier that day, and sees that Jones is 
now sitting in that location, I do not think that Smith would feel that anything had been taken 
from him by Jones. Likewise, in the first scenario I presented Smith would only feel that 
something was taken from him, given specific temporal restrictions, such as the particular time 
Smith reads every day. Thus, Smith’s concept of property entails that he only owns that spot 
every day, at the same time, the time he reads. 
                                                             
22 I use the word “right” here to stand in for “is lawful,” as the latter, being Hume’s phrase, entails an artificial 
human convention.  
 
23 This is not to say that Hume does not allow for the transfer of property, but that too is a social convention, and 
only possible with the permission of the original owner. This topic will be discussed further below when Hume’s 
argument concerning particular rules of property is presented. At the current point I hold that it does not pose a 
problem as long as we continue to imagine the scenario as presented (i.e. with no willing transfer of property 




The second major difference between Hume’s concept of property and Smith’s concept 
of property pertains to Hume’s claim that one’s property is some external good. Importantly I do 
not want to present a concept of property which no longer holds as its object external goods, 
because I am attempting to present a concept of property which holds the major tenets of Hume’s 
concept of property. Presenting an entirely new concept of property could ultimately, I believe, 
lend an unfair advantage to my ultimate goal of presenting a possible instinctual origin of our 
concept of property, and thus a natural origin of the virtue of justice. Although initially 
remaining within this framework of external goods may seem problematic, I hold that the 
concept of property which Smith has can be shown to concern an external good. 
The major obstacle Smith’s concept of property faces on this front, is pointing to the 
specific external good itself. For example, when considering Smith’s sitting spot, what is it that 
Smith owns, that is, what is his property, even considering that said property is temporally 
restricted? It can’t be the actual ground he is sitting on, or we could imagine a scenario in which 
Smith is sitting in a particular location, Jones asks him to stand, and takes Smith’s sitting spot, 
and upon Smith claiming “Jones, you took my sitting spot,” Jones simply digs up the earth below 
him, hands it to Smith, and then sits back down in Smith’s spot. I do not believe Smith would be 
satisfied with this response, and he would instead still feel that Jones took his spot. Likewise 
consider Smith’s reading spot, which is, as earlier stated, always in the same location under a 
particular tree. Now imagine that one night Jones goes to Smith’s reading spot, digs up the earth 
under the tree where Smith reads, and replaces it with earth from a different location. I believe 
that Smith, if he realized the earth in his reading spot had been replaced or not, would still 
consider the particular location he reads every day to be his reading spot. So, we know the 




understand the object of his ownership as the space in which he was sitting or the space he reads 
every day. Thus, in the examples provided, concerning Smith’s concept of property, the external 
good which is the object of Smith’s concept of property is physical space,
24
 or the physical area, 
of his spots. 
Although initially including physical space under the heading of external goods may 
seem like a desperate attempt to include a concept of property within Hume’s happy state, I 
would actually like to argue that it is already a present and active external good which is an 
object of our concept of property in our current necessitous state, but regularly ignored. Take for 
example the above presented scenario in which Student X feels that Student Y has taken her seat, 
by sitting at the desk she sits in every class period. Similarly to Smith’s scenarios, Student X 
does not own the desk in the classroom that she claims as hers. Likewise she does not even own 
the physical part of the classroom upon which her desk sits, meaning the carpet or floorboards, or 
concrete etcetera. Like in the Smith examples, I also do not think that Student X would care if 
her desk was replaced by another identical desk, placed in the same location as the original desk, 
as often happens in classrooms. However, as was presented above, even with these 
considerations in mind, it surprises few, when Student X claims that Student Y took her seat. So, 
I believe that Student X is utilizing a concept of property which includes the ownership of 
temporally restricted physical space. That is, the space on which “her” desk sits, during the time 
her lecture meets. 
I think that we can examine several other examples of this type of external good, as the 
object of property in our normal everyday lives. For example, when one purchases a ticket to see 
                                                             
24 Importantly, I am not attempting to make any significant claim, or any claim at all concerning the philosophy of 
space. I only use the word ‘space’ as I believe it best relates the meaning of what I am attempting to present. If terms 
‘region’ or ‘physical area’ carry with them less problematic consequences then I believe those terms could work as 
well. In the third chapter of this work I will attempt to present a similar external good as the object of non-human 




a movie they often refer to the seat they choose as ‘my seat’ representing a feeling of ownership 
of an external good which is itself temporally restricted, and at its core referring to a defined 
amount of space. In a theater friends are even often asked to “save my seat” when some member 
of their party needs to briefly leave the theater. Similarly, at many colloquiums, or like events in 
which there is open seating, and usually more than enough chairs for everyone, I have 
experienced scenarios in which someone will ask, before sitting down in a particular chair, if 
“anyone is sitting here?” in an attempt not to take someone else’s seat, full well knowing no 
person in the room owns any of the seats in the traditional sense. Correspondingly, most have 
experienced a scenario in which someone sits in a particular seat, gets up and vacates the seat 
and seating area for some period of time, and upon returning to find someone else in their seat, 
actually claims “you’re in my seat” or “you stole my seat” etcetera.
25
 Lastly, although such 
actions are rarely encountered among adults, if someone is physically moved from their seat or 
tricked into standing, as Smith was in the second scenario presented above, I believe most would 
agree that the initial occupier’s seat was stolen.  
If we understand temporally bound space as the external good, which is the object of the 
concept of property which could exists within Hume’s happy state, then we can also maintain 
Hume’s claim that property presupposes scarcity, even within Hume’s state of overabundance. 
Of course Hume presents this state of overabundance in an attempt to remove scarcity entirely, 
thus removing any concept of property, and ultimately the virtue of justice, but I believe that the 
above examples show that scarcity would still exists within Hume’s happy state. Importantly 
scarcity would also, like Hume holds concerning his concept of property, be necessary for the 
concept of property which I have argued could exists in Hume’s happy state. As can be 
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understood from the above examples involving Smith, it is not that sitting spots or reading spots 
under trees are scarce, as we know instead that they are all overly abundant in this happy state, 
but that it is instead that Smith’s sitting spot and Smith’s reading spot are all scarce external 
goods. Randy Barnett presents the concept of scarcity as it pertains to relevant goods in his book 
The Structure of Liberty Justice and the Rule of Law. Although his project and the current project 
have different aims, Barnett’s presentation of what he calls “defining the relevant good” is 
precisely what I believe would entail scarcity within Hume’s happy state (38). Barnett explains 
that some good is a “relevant good” if “one or more persons seek to perform two actions that are 
physically impossible to perform simultaneously” with some good (38). So, just as an apple can 
be scarce because it would be impossible for two different people to eat the entire apple, Smith’s 
space can be scarce because it is impossible for him and Jones to sit or read in it at the same 
time, just as a seat in a classroom or movie theater can be scarce because it would be impossible 
for more than one person to occupy it at any given time.  
The third and most important difference between Hume’s concept of property and the 
concept of property presented above concerns Hume’s claim that the possession of property “is 
establish’d by the laws of society; that is, by the laws of justice” (Treatise 3.2.2.11). This means, 
as was presented above, that under Hume’s view, some external good is one’s property when it is 
lawful for them alone to use it. Of course this aspect of Hume’s concept of property assumes that 
justice is an artificial virtue arising from a social convention, because, as was before presented, 
by “lawful” Hume means the artificially created laws sprouting from the artificial creation of the 
virtue of justice. This aspect of Hume’s concept of property represents the biggest difference 




possibility in Hume’s happy state of overabundance.
26
 Thus, I must outright reject this specific 
aspect of Hume’s concept of property. However, this rejection is in no way an attempt to divorce 
our concept of property, and the virtue of justice. I believe doing this would be impossible. 
Instead I would like to present a simple original instinct which distinguishes property, and a 
corresponding natural sentiment of approbation towards just character traits, and a natural 
possession of said character traits, meaning character traits which motivate honesty with respect 
to external goods. Because I hope to present a convincing depiction of the possibility of a natural 
origin of justice, it may be helpful to quickly point out that Hume often uses the word “equity” 
alongside, or in place of “justice.” I only wish to present this now, as to mitigate possible 
confusion about what “honesty” means (Cohon). I do not think Hume wishes to present justice as 
a specific kind of promise keeping, as he holds promise keeping is its own artificial virtue 
(Cohon).
27
 This is a crucial aspect of the current project, because I believe that I can now present 
the first piece of evidence supporting a natural origin of our concept of property, and thus virtue 
of justice, and when presenting this natural virtue of justice I believe using both words 
“honestly” and “fairly” will be beneficial in lessening possible confusion. 
Although there are still arguments Hume presents rejecting an instinctual origin of our 
concept of property, thus rejecting a natural origin of justice, which must be presented and 
responded to, at this point I believe I can present the first piece of evidence in favor of a natural 
foundation of our concept of property and virtue of justice. This first piece of evidence is the 
possibility to conclude that a concept of property, as described above, could be present within 
Hume’s happy state of overabundance. This importantly means that Hume’s claim that the virtue 
of justice could not exists in such a state, because no concept of property could exists in such a 
                                                             
26 This is why I have replaced “lawful for one to use” with “has a right to use.” This “right” will be discussed below. 
 




state, can be rejected. It is also important in claiming that we can instinctually distinguish 
property. Although more must be said on this topic, at the very least, it seems that Hume’s 
argument concerning this happy state of overabundance supports an instinctual origin of our 
concept of property, in the same way that it supports an instinctual origin of the natural virtue of 
benevolence. As was presented above Hume claims that this change in the parameters of human 
existence, specifically imagining a state of overabundance, is unable to render the natural virtues 
unusable. This point now seems to support the instinctual origin of our concept of property in the 
same way, because our concept of property, as presented above, is also able to endure this 
change in the structure of human existence. 
Although an instinctual origin of property does not alone provide us with a sufficient 
reason to understand justice as a natural virtue it is certainly the most important piece of the 
puzzle. This is because with a concept of property within Hume’s happy state it is not a far 
stretch to consider how we feel about possessors of character traits which concern property. As 
was presented in the first chapter of this work Hume holds that “to have a sense of virtue, is 
nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The 
very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration” (Treatise 3.1.2.3). Thus, “an action, or 
sentiment, or character trait is virtuous or vicious; why? because its view causes a pleasure or 
uneasiness of a particular kind”  (Treatise 3.1.2.3). Of course remembering that this particular 
kind of pleasure or pain is from a disinterested point of view like as the point of view from a 
“judicious spectator” would be (Treatise 3.3.1.14). So, I believe if we “turn [our] reflection into 
[our] own breast” when considering, for example, the scenario in which Smith is sitting, Jones 
asks him to stand, and then Jones takes Smith’s spot, when he stands, we will “find a sentiment 




remembering that it is actually a sense of disapprobation towards the character trait of Jones 
which motivates him to take Smith’s spot in this scenario. This sense of disapprobation is 
specifically a result of the contemplation of the character trait which Jones has which motivates 
him to act dishonestly, or unfairly, concerning Smith’s property. Likewise if Jones tricked Smith 
and sat in Smith’s spot, and upon Smith claiming “Jones you took my spot” Jones got up, 
allowing Smith to take his spot back, I think most would feel a sense of approbation towards the 
character trait which Jones possesses which motivates him to act honestly, or fairly, with respect 
to Smith’s property. Thus, I hold that we can examine the virtue of justice also enduring this 
specific change in the structure of human existence, which, as was already presented, is evidence 
Hume utilizes for the origin of the natural virtues. So, we have gained the first piece of evidence 
to conclude that justice, and property, arise from inseparable parts of human nature, which a 
change in the structure of human existence (specifically a state of overabundance) cannot 
eliminate, even if it does limit those external goods we consider to be one’s property.  
In defense of my claims concerning what I think we would feel towards character traits of 
Jones I am, as Hume does, relying on my ability to turn my reflection inward, but I also hold that 
if one considers similar, real life examples, like the ones described above, I think one can see that 
such feelings are not in actuality implausible accounts. Consider again, a scenario in which in a 
movie theater, classroom, or like setting with open and abundant seating, a companion asks you 
to save his seat. If someone comes and sits in the seat you are saving, and upon you telling them 
“someone is sitting there” or “this seat is saved” etcetera, this new person ignores you and 
precedes to sit down in the seat you were attempting to save, I feel that most would have a 
feeling of disapprobation towards the character trait which motivated this new person to sit in 




Hume points out that we have toward honest actions concerning external goods like apples or 
wood, etcetera, seem to likewise be felt concerning an external good like temporally bound 
space, and thus seem possible within Hume’s happy state of overabundance.   
Although this first piece of evidence is important to the current project, it also exposes 
what could be a fundamental problem for the current project of offering a plausible account of 
the natural origin of property and justice. Simply put, what about the wide reaching property 
disagreements that would be possible in Hume’s happy state, even with the concept of property, 
and virtue of justice which I hold could exists in such a state. What I mean by property 
disagreements is the problematic identification of what the parameters of Smith’s “right” to any 
of the above spaces (sitting, or reading) are. I have claimed that Smith would feel that he had a 
right to these spaces, and ultimately I hold that this feeling would be the result of the virtue of 
justice, which holds as its object Smith’s concept of temporally restricted property which holds 
space as its external good. Thus far I have, as Hume initially does as well, considered a general 
concept of property and virtue of justice, which I believe we could observe within Hume’s happy 
state. The current problem concerns the particular rules or laws, resulting from our virtue of 
justice, which direct the ownership of property in specific cases. As when I presented the 
scenario in which Smith’s reading spot, the one he uses every day at the same time, is taken by 
Jones, Jones may not feel that he should move, if he disagrees that Smith has a right to said spot 
every day at some specific time. The only way one can determine if Jones should move relies on 
the particular rules of the concept of property, by which we can distinguish property in specific 
cases.  
With this in mind must it be a part of our instinct which enables one to know that 




within some temporal restriction? Likewise, would the number of days or amount of time before 
said spot was Smith’s be included in our instinct? Additions like these would certainly be 
ridiculous to include into our instinctual understanding of a concept of property, and ultimately 
our natural virtue of justice. I have presented what I believe would be an instance of a mine/your 
distinction in Hume’s happy state, and thus hold that a concept of property must exist. I also 
believe that claiming that we have a sense of disapprobation towards Jones’s character trait 
which motivates him to take Smith’s spot must mean that the virtue of justice must too exist, but 
seeing the parameters of this virtue, especially when considering its existence in our current 
necessitous state, as aspects of an instinct, seems like an impossible task. Thus it could be 
claimed that exposing the existence of a concept of property, and virtue of justice in Hume’s 
happy state cannot be understood as evidence for understanding this concept and virtue as 
originating from simple original instincts, as it either neglects the fact that our concept of 
property has specific parameters, or forces one to accept that all of these parameters are included 
in our instinct, which seems unreasonable to propose. This potential problem must be carefully 
considered below.  
Section IV: On the Possibility of a Simple Original Instinctual Concept of Property 
One of the most important objections Hume presents to the possibility of an instinctual 
origin of property concerns precisely the problem discussed at the end of section three. At the 
core of this problem is Hume’s claim that “instincts in men are all simple” (Enquiry 3.2.40). This 
meaning that the natural instincts one has entail no great complexities. Hume even supports this 
claim by arguing that nature only needs to embed simple instincts in humans, otherwise it would 
have “create[d] a rational creature, without trusting any thing to the operation of his reason” 




hunger, which Hume presents as an example of a simple original instinct, I believe most would 
agree that this instinct is certainly simple. For one, to distinguish between being hungry or not 
hungry seems to entail no great complexity. Even considering that there are most likely an 
indefinite number of degrees of hunger, at its core there seems to be no real intricacy involved in 
the instinct. Likewise, at its core, the instinct to care for one’s offspring seems to entail no great 
complexities. Essentially to care for one’s offspring is to keep said offspring alive until the point 
at which the offspring can care for itself, and repeat the process. Hume utilizes an example 
concerning a non-human animal to further represent this point concerning the simplicity of 
instincts. “All birds of the same species, in every age and country, build their nests alike: In this 
we see the force of instinct” (Enquiry 3.2.44). Importantly this means that Hume also holds that 
the natural virtues which are the result of instincts, like those virtues under the heading of 
benevolence, are also uncomplicated. This is supported by Hume’s claim that each of these 
virtues “sufficiently engage every heart, on the first apprehension of them” (Enquiry 2.1.5). 
Meaning these virtues necessitate little contemplation, and are instead understood quickly and 
easily like the instincts of hunger or the instinct to care for one’s offspring. 
Hume holds that a property instinct could not be simple, and thus does not exist. To 
present this Hume first examines the particular laws “by which justice is directed, and property 
determined” which exists in our current necessitous state (Enquiry 3.2.22). Hume holds that 
doing this will enable one to see that  “we shall still be presented with the same conclusion” as 
he holds we were when presented with a general concept of property, as was discussed above, 
that justice and our concept of property are artificial human conventions and not the product of 
simple original instincts (Enquiry 3.2.22). Hume claims that when we examine these specific 




of property, and ultimately we will see that they are far too complicated to arise from simple 
original instincts which are embedded within human nature. 
Who sees not, for instance, that whatever is produced or improved by a man’s art of 
industry ought, for ever, to be secured to him, in order to give encouragement to such 
useful habits and accomplishments? That property ought also to descend to children and 
relations, for the same useful purpose? That it may be alienated by consent, in order to 
beget that commerce and intercourse, which is so beneficial to human society? And that 
all contracts and promises ought carefully to be fulfilled, in order to secure mutual trust 
and confidence, by which the general interest of mankind is so much promoted? (Enquiry 
3.2.28). 
 
Hume even includes in this claim that when “the interests of society may require a rule of justice 
in a particular case” but several are all “equally beneficial” we see that “possession alone, and 
first possession, is supposed to convey property, where no body else has any preceding claim and 
pretension” (Enquiry 3.2.31). Furthermore Hume claims that in some cases, concerning 
particular laws which determine property, it is “highly requisite, that prescription or long 
possession should convey property” although the exact amount of time “is impossible for reason 
alone to determine” (Enquiry 3.2.32).  Ultimately, these ways of distinguishing property are 
aimed at public utility as well, in that they enable the laws which determine property, and thus 
the virtue of justice, to never appear arbitrary (Enquiry 3.2.31). 
This enables Hume to claim that the particular rules we have to distinguish property, in 
our modern state, “must have recourse to statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, and a hundred 
other circumstances; some of which are constant and inflexible, some variable and arbitrary” 
(Enquiry 3.2.35). At this point Hume is able to claim that “though it seems a very simple 
proposition to say, that nature, by an instinctive sentiment, distinguishes property, yet in reality 
we shall find, that there are required for that purpose ten thousand different instincts, and these 
employed about objects of the greatest intricacy and nicest discernment” (Enquiry 3.2.41). Hume 




represents the specific laws discussed above we find “any possession acquired by occupation, by 
industry, by prescription, by inheritance, by contract &c” as property (Enquiry 3.2.40). Hume 
next poses the question “can we think, that nature, by an original instinct, instructs us in all these 
methods of acquisition?” (Enquiry 3.2.41). Hume points out that even the words “inheritance 
and contract, stand for ideas infinitely complicated; and to define them exactly, a hundred 
volumes of laws, and a thousand volumes of commentators, have not been found sufficient” 
(Enquiry 3.2.42). Hume adds that we would need another original instinct which recognized the 
authority of kings of senates and enabled us to “mark all the boundaries of their jurisdiction,” 
and yet another instinct which recognized the authority of judges, praetors, chancellors, and 
juries (Enquiry 3.2.43) Thus Hume is able to conclude that our concept of property is in no way 
simple, and as all instincts are simple, our concept of property cannot arise from a simple 
original instinct embedded within human nature. This, of course, means that the virtue of justice 
cannot arise from a simple original instinct embedded within human nature. 
Ultimately I agree with Hume that our current concept of property is complex and 
multifaceted, but hold that it is not in actuality problematic for my goal of showing that our 
concept of property and virtue of justice could arise from simple original instincts embedded 
within human nature. Although this may seem like a rather unreasonable position, I believe that 
with the consideration of one amendment to Hume’s claim concerning simple original instincts, 
we will find that it is in actuality completely cogent. This amendment is that simple original 
instincts often produce complex artificial human conventions. What I mean is that simple 
original instincts can act like seeds which humans over time grow into complex, multifaceted 
conventions which are the result of our function of sympathy, aimed, although not always 




institutions arise merely from the necessities of human society,” with one exception, Hume’s use 
of “merely” (Enquiry 3.2.43). I believe that it is true that these conventions concerning property, 
as well as some other human conventions, arise due to the needs and necessities of human 
society, but they arise out of a simple original instinct. I believe that if we examine some of the 
simple original instincts, which Hume offers, we will find that they are responsible for, and are 
still at the core of, complex artificial human conventions.  
Consider the instinct of hunger, which Hume presents as a clear example of a simple 
original instinct. Hunger, like justice, has a sole object, nourishment, or more simply food. Thus, 
the object of hunger is food, like the object of justice is property. However, Hume holds that our 
instinct of hunger is simple, thus the object of hunger must too be distinguished by a simple 
original instinct. This initially does not seem to entail a problem for Hume. By and large humans 
are able to distinguish food, due to what is undoubtedly a simple original instinct. We would 
even be able to observe this in the pre-societal human. Although this is certainly the case, I 
believe if we look we can see complex artificial human conventions which, although are the 
result of our instinct of hunger, and instinctual concept of food, are themselves multifaceted and 
are not included in our instinct themselves. Take for example Soufflé. Soufflé is food, it is an 
example of an object of hunger, but it would be ridiculous to claim that by simple original 
instinct one is able to create or in any way acquire Soufflé, as there is no way our concept of 
food includes Soufflé specifically. Even if one had the raw ingredients, in for example Hume’s 
happy state of overabundance, this complex dish would require many cookbooks and 
instructions, and most likely a lot of practice. Equally anything which is the product of complex 
baking or cooking is not included in our simple original instinct. I would go as far to say that the 




distinguish it as food. So, I agree that a simple original instinct does not instruct us in all of the 
modern methods of acquiring property, but the same can be said for our simple original 
instinctual concept of food. It does not instruct us in all of the methods of acquiring food, naming 
complex baking or cooking. Similarly I have experienced on a number of occasions the 
following scenario: at a restaurant a dish comes out, and I am unsure if a specific part of said 
dish is supposed to be eaten, or is a decorative garnish. I believe most would agree the answer to 
this question is not embedded within our instinctual concept of food. Obviously we should still 
understand hunger and our concept of food to be based in simple original instincts, but I believe 
that our simple original instinct of hunger and instinctual concept of food are the fundamental 
bases for these complex human conventions which have created objects of hunger such as 
Soufflé, which are themselves the product of human conventions like culinary arts and baking.  
So, inheritance and contracts are not a part of our instinctual concept of property, in the 
same way the production of Soufflé or the garnishing of a dish is not a part of our instinctual 
concept of food. Instead these are results of human conventions which grew out of simple 
original instincts embedded within human nature, but only did so over time due an attempt to 
meet the needs and desires of society. Thus, I can agree with Hume that nature has not, by simple 
original instinct, instructed us in all the methods of the acquisition of property, but that this claim 
does not rule out the possibility of an instinctual concept of property, from which complex, 
multifaceted human conventions have grown. The definition of property which entails that “any 
possession acquired by occupation, by industry, by prescription, by inheritance, by contract &c” 
is simply an artificial human convention, which has grown from a simple original instinct. 
(Enquiry 3.2.40). The fact that “inheritance and contract, stand for ideas infinitely complicated; 




commentators, have not been found sufficient” is comparable to the many cookbooks and 
general culinary arts textbooks which currently exist, and are similarly not found as sufficient as 
many more are produced with new methods of cooking and baking, and even new dishes which 
before never existed (Enquiry 3.2.42). 
I think we can observe many more examples of simple original instincts which have 
sprouted complex human conventions, meaning this is not a phenomenon which only occurs in 
our instinctual concept of food and instinct of hunger, which I have inappropriately claimed as a 
possibility for all instincts. Specifically consider the natural virtue to care for one’s offspring, 
and our instinctual concept of offspring, which is of course the object of this natural virtue. 
Adoption and foster care are two acts which I doubt are included in our instinctual concept of 
offspring, or our natural virtue of caring for our offspring, as they are complex conventions, 
much like inheritance and contracts. Although I hold this to be the case I doubt few would be 
willing to remove this virtue from the catalogue of natural virtues. Similarly I hold that if we 
examine the particular rules and laws which pertain to the care of offspring we will find that like 
our concept of property, they must have recourse to statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, and 
a hundred other circumstances “some of which are constant and inflexible, some variable and 
arbitrary” (Enquiry 3.2.35). I believe we can see this in the mere fact that all of these rules and 
laws are not exactly the same in every part of the world. For example the age you are no longer 
legally responsible for your offspring is certainly not included in our simple original instinct, as 
it is not the same everywhere and certainly to some degree seems arbitrary. It seems much more 





Likewise I think we can see particular rules, laws, and conventions which have developed 
from the natural virtues under the heading of benevolence, and which also vary from culture to 
culture, further showing the possibility of social conventions to develop from the natural virtues. 
Take, for example, two of the natural virtues, under the heading of benevolence, humane, and 
merciful. In some cultures the natural virtues of humane and merciful have resulted in the 
legalization of euthanasia, and in others this specific rule is considered to be the opposite of 
humane or merciful. Similarly, albeit far less important, are the social conventions of pen pal 
relationships and social media friendships which I believe most likely arose from our natural 
virtue of friendship and instinctual concept of friends, but which are in no way included in the 
simple original instincts from which these concepts and virtues arose. 
With this in mind it is not difficult to see Hume’s claim, as presented above, that the 
specific rules we have to distinguish property “must have recourse to statutes, customs, 
precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumstances; some of which are constant and 
inflexible, some variable and arbitrary” is not in actuality problematic for a instinctual concept of 
property and natural virtue of justice (Enquiry 3.2.35). This is because it can now be claimed that 
some of the specific rules, or conventions,  resulting from the natural virtues, and even the 
natural instinct of hunger, are themselves artificial human conventions which of course are the 
result of  statutes, customs, precedents, analogies, and a hundred other circumstances.  
However, I do believe it is significant that Hume claims some of the aspects of the rules 
and laws which distinguish property would be “constant and inflexible,” because it supports my 
claim that there is something grounded and permanent within these conventions which 
distinguish property. This would be necessary for all conventions which are founded on simple 




example, as presented above, there may be artificial human conventions which have grown out 
of the natural virtue of caring for one’s offspring, but keeping said offspring alive is going to be 
at the core of all of these conventions, and will be a constant and inflexible aspect of them, 
because it is the simple original instinct which is at the core of this natural virtue, and thus all 
conventions which have grown from this virtue. Likewise, when considering our instinct of 
hunger, and instinctual concept of food, no convention will arise which entails some inedible 
object, as attainment of nourishment is the constant and inflexible aspect of this instinct. So, I 
believe when Hume claims some of the aspects of the rules which distinguish property are 
constant and inflexible, he is pointing, of course not purposely, to aspects which are the seed of 
the entire human convention which, I hold, is a simple original instinct embedded in human 
nature, which initially enables such conventions to grow. 
If we examine the inflexible and constant aspects of our rules of property, then I believe 
we will be able to uncover what an instinctual concept of property would entail, and thus be able 
to present the possibility of the natural virtue of justice. Interestingly, as was presented above, 
Hume claims that when public utility would be equally benefited by some particular rule or law, 
concerning property, we must look to “possession alone, and first possession… where no body 
else has any preceding claim and pretension” and “long possession” to convey property (Enquiry 
3.2.31, Enquiry 3.2.32). Although Hume presents this point for very different reasons, I hold that 
it actually enables us to see the major constant and inflexible aspect of our conventions which 
distinguish property. I believe if we reverse Hume’s reasoning here we will be able to present a 
possible instinctual concept of property. Simply put, we do not revert back to these simple rules 
of possession which distinguish property because two different conventions serve public utility 




rules, laws, and conventions are based upon possession, and no current convention aids in the 
particular property dispute which is being encountered, so we revert back to what is embedded 
within our human nature.  
Possession, in the simplest sense, comes down to having or holding some external good. 
With this in mind it must be the case that we know others do not have the specific external good 
we possess at the exact time we possess it, and I believe this enables a simple mine/your 
distinction, which concerns external goods (such as, but not limited to, space).
28
 Specifically, 
concerning this understanding of possession, I think we could understand ‘my possession’ or ‘not 
my possession,’ which in turn leads to the identification of ‘your possession.’ Thus at its core our 
simple original instinct which distinguishes property could be a mine/your distinction concerning 
external goods. Importantly, what I mean by ‘the specific time we possess it,’ is the literal 
current possession of some good, meaning our instinctual concept of property involves a 
mine/your distinction concerning external goods one is currently in possession of. Consequently 
scarcity, as explained above in Hume’s happy state, would automatically be an aspect of our 
instinctual concept of property, as scarcity of the relevant good, meaning the good one is 
currently in possession of. Furthermore, as was also presented earlier in Hume’s happy state of 
overabundance, this instinctual concept of property would also automatically entail the 
ownership of temporally restricted external goods. The temporal restriction being the current 
possession of some good, or what may easily be thought of as a temporal restriction of ‘now,’ for 
example the spot in which Smith is currently sitting. 
                                                             
28 I am not convinced, or even persuaded, that possession, meaning our simple mine/your distinction only concerns 
external goods, but as was presented earlier in this work I am adopting Hume’s claim that property concerns external 
goods, and will thus attempt to provide an instinctual concept of property that is similarly concerned, as to not 




Now that a possible instinctual concept of property has been presented I believe we can 
consider how we feel about character traits which motivate others to take ‘my possessions’ or via 
our function of sympathy character traits which motivate others to take ‘your possessions,’ again 
considering only current possessions. When considering current possessions, I don’t think it is 
implausible to claim that we instinctually have a sense of disapprobation towards character traits 
which motivate others to take some external good we are currently in possession of. Likewise, I 
feel a sense of approbation towards character traits which motivate others to respect, or not take 
our current possessions, is more than feasible. I hold that this can be exemplified by considering 
how we feel about stealing, albeit, a very simple concept of stealing, in which we only consider 
the act of taking some external good from someone who is currently in possession of it, meaning 
taking some external good which is, under this instinctual concept of property, not ‘your 
possession.’ I would imagine that in this simplified state all would agree that we have a sense of 
disapprobation towards character traits which motivate others to steal. This is best represented by 
the above scenario in which Smith is sitting in a particular location and Jones asks him to stand, 
only so we can take his spot. Or the like scenario in which Smith is physically removed from his 
spot by Jones, so Jones can take his spot. I believe our sense of disapprobation towards Jones’s 
character trait which motivates him to act in these ways shows the possibility of a simple 
instinctual virtue of justice. Thus, I hold that our instinctual virtue of justice is actually 
represented by something Hume, as was earlier presented, calls “first possession,” which is 
possession of some external good “where no body else has any preceding claim and pretension” 
(Enquiry 3.2.31). Importantly, though, this preceding claim would simply be current possession. 
So, our simple instinctual concept of property needs only to concern a mine/your distinction 




feeling of approbation towards character traits which motivate others to not take, or respect 
others’ current possessions, meaning respect first possession (in this limited sense), and likewise 
a sense of disapprobation towards the opposite character traits. 
This instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice would certainly avoid 
Hume’s complexity objection, concerning simple original instincts, as both are far from 
complex. One way to support the simplicity of this concept and virtue is to show that, as 
understood above, I believe that we can now see that the virtue of justice does “sufficiently 
engage every heart, on the first apprehension of” it, just as Hume claims the other natural virtues 
do (Enquiry 2.1.5). I hold that this can be seen when considering the simple natural virtue of 
justice itself. If the feeling of disapprobation, described above, concerning the simple notion of 
stealing, meaning taking some possession that does not belong to you, does, as I think it would, 
exists, then I hold that the natural virtue of justice does sufficiently engage every heart, when 
understood as presented above. Importantly, I also believe that this can be imagined to be a 
possible occurrence in the pre-societal human, who Hume claims would in no way be able to 
understand any concept of property or virtue of justice. I believe if we consider a pre-societal 
human, meaning a human in a small familial group, we can imagine any number of scenarios in 
which if this pre-societal human had current first possession of some external good, and said 
external good was at some point taken from him, even if this good was merely a seat next to the 
fire (meaning a temporally restricted space), that this pre-societal human would have a sense of 
disapprobation towards the character trait which motivated some other member of his familial 
group to take his possession.  
I hold that it is not until the artificial human conventions which distinguish property are 




not engaging every heart. At their core these conventions will concern new, sometimes arbitrary, 
rules of possession, which I think actually enable more disagreement, requiring new conventions. 
At this point it may be hard to see how any property disagreement could arise, if we do have the 
above described instinctual concept of property, and natural virtue of justice, but I believe the 
formation of society can explain this. Although current first possession remains as our instinctual 
concept of property, once a part of a society I believe we quickly see that we will need some sort 
of agreement as to not be forced to spend all of our time maintaining our possession of necessary 
and desired external goods, this meaning, some agreement which allows us to maintain our 
property, without physically being in possession of it. Thus the concept of some sort of 
retroactive first possession is born. This being something along the lines of: “I was in possession 
of X first, although I am not currently in possession of X, I still have some temporally restricted 
ownership of it.” Along with this comes the inclusion of what Hume calls long possession, as 
presented above, which begins to specify the extent of the retroactive first possession. Such as: “I 
was in possession of X first, and for an extended period of time, and although I am not currently 
in possession of X, I have some temporally restricted ownership of it.”  
From these two, quite possibly necessary, artificial developments I believe property 
disputes are inevitable, and human conventions which aid in such disputes are created. For 
example consider the scenario which was presented in the third section of this chapter, in which 
Smith has a reading spot that he uses at the same time every day, and feels he has a temporally 
restricted ownership of said spot. This I believe would be Smith utilizing some sort of retroactive 
first and long possession of this temporally restricted space. Importantly, when I presented this 
example as a possible piece of evidence for the existence of a concept of property within Hume’s 




not feel that he should move, meaning he may not feel that Smith has any right to that specific 
reading spot. Jones might feel this because he is in current first possession of said reading spot. 
Unlike in the other presented scenario in which Jones take Smith’s current spot, in which I hold 
that Jones should feel that he should move given the sense of disapprobation I believe he would 
feel towards the character trait which motivated him to take Smith’s spot, and the shame of 
possessing such a trait. Likewise when a student arrives to class, and claims that some other 
student took her seat, the current occupier may not feel that he should move, for the same reason 
Jones might feel this way, if they hold that the former regular occupier has no right to the seat at 
the current time. Thus, a disagreement concerning property would likely arise, because both 
Smith and Jones could claim that they had a right to use the same space at the same time. At this 
point, which is likely inevitable in any society, additional artificial human conventions would 
need to be created to resolve and prevent such disputes.  
Notably, concerning some of the artificial human conventions which we currently have to 
distinguish property, I hold that the simple instinctual concept of property presented above can 
be seen as a realistic starting point. Considering contracts, I think we can see a kind of 
conditional possession at the core of this convention, and likewise when considering inheritance 
I believe some kind of future possession is being utilized. Also, I do not think that it is 
problematic that we do not have conventions for all possible disputes. Even including some of 
the possible disputes presented in this work, concerning desks or seats at the movies. Importantly 
though, we do sometimes see different understood conventions, even if said conventions are 
sometimes ignored by some, and not reflected in any societies official conventions or laws. For 
example, putting a coat or some other item on a chair in an attempt to save ‘your seat’ seems like 




the artificial development, resulting from being in a society, concerning retroactive first 
possession. Significantly though, the current work is only concerned with presenting a possible 
instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice, from which it is possible human 
conventions could have grown and developed, within Hume’s moral framework, thus the 
particular conventions need not be presented in detail here. 
Ultimately, I hold that it should be unsurprising that these conventions do not always 
sufficiently engage every heart on first apprehension of them. If at some point Smith and Jones 
sign a contract which specifies when either party can use some particular reading spot, it would 
be unlikely that either party’s heart would be sufficiently engaged at first apprehension. I hold 
this would be the case because these conventions are created to meet and mitigate property 
disputes which at their core include two people who think some external good is both ‘my 
possession’ at the same time. Even though contracts would ultimately be founded on our natural 
sentiment of justice, and I hold that this means that on further contemplation the violation of 
many contracts would result in the same sense of disapprobation as the simple notion of stealing 
results in, I believe it stands that any complex human conventions will likely not sufficiently 
engage the heart on first apprehension. Take for example the human conventions of adoption and 
foster care. A number of people do not seem to have their hearts sufficiently engaged when 
considering the conventions of adoption and foster care on first apprehension, even though such 
conventions are based on the natural virtue of caring for one’s offspring, which Hume holds does 
engage every heart at first apprehension. Likewise, a pen pal friendship would likely not engage 
every heart at first apprehension, even though such a human convention is founded on the natural 
virtue of friendship. Thus, I do not believe it any different to point out the possibility of the 




Section V: A Further Argument against the Possibility of a Natural Virtue of Justice 
 One substantial objection to the possibility of the above presented natural virtue of justice 
can be seen in the third fictional instantiation of human existence, which Hume presents in a 
further attempt to reject the possibility of an instinctual concept of property in general. This 
fictional instantiation is certainly the most realistic situation, of the three Hume offers, that the 
human race could find itself in. We know this to be the case, because like in the state of great 
scarcity and need that Hume presents, at different points in history, considering specific global 
locations and groups of people, there have been scenarios in which a society falls into extreme 
“want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and industry cannot preserve the 
greater number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery” (Enquiry 3.1.8).  As 
presented above, Hume claims that in this kind of dire situation “the strict laws of justice are 
suspended” and likewise our concept of property would dissolve (Enquiry 3.1.8). Hume offers 
two specific examples of such situations by considering the aftermath of a shipwreck, and a 
person falling into a society of ruffians, who have no “protection of laws and government” 
(Enquiry 3.1.9).  
Although Hume presents this instantiation of human existence to further his claim that 
alterations to the structure of society can be used to show that our concept of property and virtue 
of justice are not inseparable aspects of our human nature, and can thus disappear given the right 
scenario, I hold that it also provides an important specific objection to the above presented 
natural virtue of justice. Specifically, if Hume is correct that dire situations such as these could 
cause a disregard for any form of justice, including the simple sentiment above described, in 
which I claimed that we have a sense of disapprobation towards character traits which motivate 




towards character traits which motivate others to steal, then it seems unlikely that this sentiment 
arises from an inseparable aspect of human nature. This would follow for the same reason Hume 
claims we cannot have an instinctual concept of property if it can be shown to disappear given 
the right structure of human existence. 
Before I offer a response to such an objection to the natural virtue of justice, I would like 
to first claim that this instantiation of human existence which Hume offers does not threaten the 
instinctual concept of property I offered in the last section, and thus fails on at least one account. 
When specifically considering the example of a shipwreck, Hume poses the question “Is it any 
crime, after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, 
without regard to former limitations of property?” (Enquiry 3.1.8). Thus Hume is claiming that 
with the disappearance of the virtue of justice, there would be no concern for the former 
limitations of property, meaning our concept of property would too vanish. With the above 
presented, simple instinctual concept of property, I do not think that a shipwreck, or any 
similarly dire situation can be shown to eliminate a simple mine/your distinction concerning 
currently possessed external goods. If, after a shipwreck, I find some necessary or desired 
external goods washed up upon the shore with me, once in my possession, I think I will 
inevitably return to my simple original instinctual concept of property, as I will know my 
possession is whatever this external good that washed up on shore is, and it is not the possession 
of any other shipwreck survivor, as I currently possess it. So, I can agree that the former 
limitations of property would in fact disappear; if that means the artificial human conventions 
which have grown from our instinctual concept of property would disappear. Likewise if one 
were to fall into a society of ruffians, as Hume proposes, I still hold that when this new member 




currently possessed, he could have and could be utilizing this instinctual concept of property. Of 
course the new member in the society of ruffians would be unable to make reference to the 
artificial human conventions concerning property which were in place wherever he was 
originally from, but this does not entail a necessary loss of the simple instinctual concept of 
property. 
The problematic objection embedded within Hume’s presentation of a state of dire need, 
for my view regarding a natural origin of justice, concerns how we feel about the character traits 
which motivate others to respect or conversely steal property, in these dire situations. As 
presented above, Hume claims that after a shipwreck it would be no crime to seize “whatever 
means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of” (Enquiry 3.1.8). Although I do understand 
that by “crime” Hume is literally referring to one violating the laws which our artificial human 
convention of justice has created, I do not think it is unfair to understand this claim as also 
entailing the elimination of any sense of disapprobation we have towards injustice, or for my 
purposes, the elimination of the simple sentiment of disapprobation we have towards the notion 
of stealing presented above. This is an important clarification concerning the present objection, 
because as my above presented natural virtue of justice entails, the elimination of the artificial 
human conventions which have grown out of our natural virtue would not be problematic for my 
view to accommodate. Similarly it would be problematic if Hume is correct in claiming that, 
once dropped in a society of ruffians we would similarly lose any sense of disapprobation 
towards stealing, and approbation towards honest treatment of our property. Thus Hume’s 
objection to the current work would be that in any state of great need there would be no virtue of 
justice present, even the simple sentiment described above, and this shows that justice cannot 




Ultimately I hold that this objection can be defeated, meaning we would still have a sense 
of disapprobation towards character traits which motivated acts of stealing in a state of such 
great need, and a sense of approbation towards the opposite. I believe this can most easily be 
seen if we consider ourselves in such a scenario. If in a state of great need we possessed some 
external good, and it was forcibly taken from us, I feel confident claiming that we would have a 
sense of disapprobation towards the character trait which motivated the thief. Importantly 
though, I hold that in such a state we would be much less likely to work towards the goal of 
“judicious spectator” which Hume claims we must, to assure we do not have variations in our 
function of sympathy (Treatise 3.3.1.14). More specifically this meaning, we would most likely 
not be making our moral distinctions form a completely disinterested point of view. This would 
in turn limit the ability of our function of sympathy to enable us to have a sense of 
disapprobation towards character traits which motivated others to steal external goods from those 
far removed from us, and most importantly I hold this would also enable many to have less of a 
sense of disapprobation, or to ignore such a sense, toward their own character traits which 
motivated them to steal from others. I believe that this explains the mindset many seem to have 
in such scenarios. In that they will readily steal from those far removed from them to assure the 
survival of those close to them. Of course, as disinterestedness is a natural virtue, meaning it too 
arises from a simple original instinct, I am not claiming that such a state of great need would 
cause such a virtue to disappear, but instead it would be underdeveloped or be ignored in an 
attempt to better the chances of survival for individuals, and close-knit groups. 
Therefore, I can agree with Hume that in a state of great need, such as after a shipwreck, 
or after being place in a society of ruffians, the human conventions we currently have concerning 




have evidence to believe there would still be a simple instinctual concept of property in such a 
state. I also hold that the virtue of justice could also be present in such a state, but the extreme 
life and death situation would cause many to ignore the sense of disapprobation we have towards 
stealing by lessening the extent we work towards acting as a judicious spectator. However, when 
considering ourselves and those close to us, I hold, we can clearly see the possibility of having a 
sense of disapprobation towards character traits which motivated others to steal from us and 
those close to us. Ultimately I believe this shows that even with this specific alteration to the 
structure of human existence our concept of property and virtue of justice would not in fact, as 
Hume claims, disappear.     
Conclusion 
 My goal in this chapter was to present the major arguments Hume offers to reject an 
instinctual origin of our concept of property and thus a natural origin of our virtue of justice, and 
respond to each with what I hold are at least feasible possibilities. Even if this instinctual concept 
of property and natural virtue of justice presented in this chapter are not convincing beyond any 
doubt, I believe it still presents a problem for Hume’s view, which would need to be addressed. I 
hold it shows at the very least that an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice 
are possible, in the three alternate instantiations of human existence, in which Hume claims they 
are not. Furthermore, if Hume’s claim that a virtue’s ability to survive such changes to the 
structure of human existence is evidence for it placement among the natural virtues, then the 
virtue of justice which I have presented seems to have made steps in the direction of a re-
categorization. Likewise if we understand the simple concept of property and virtue of justice 












The goal of the previous chapter was to present the major arguments Hume provides 
rejecting an instinctual concept of property and natural origin of justice, and attempt to respond 
with objections to each of these arguments. I believe that, collectively, these objections to 
Hume’s arguments are able to, at the very least, provide a compelling case to revisit and 
challenge Hume’s claims concerning the impossibility of an instinctual concept of property, and 
thus natural virtue of justice within his moral framework. Although the current project is 
certainly vulnerable to any broad objections to Hume’s moral theory in general (such as, but not 
limited to, any objections to the foundational aspects of Hume’s theory, for example, the moral 
sentiments, or the psychological function of sympathy, or more specifically Hume’s definitional 
understanding of property and or justice), no responses to any of these possible general 
objections will be offered in the current work, as the goal of this work is to present a convincing 
argument in favor of considering an instinctual concept of property and ultimately a natural 
virtue of justice within Hume’s moral framework. 
There is however an important comprehensive objection I think Hume, remaining entirely 
within his own moral framework, could offer in an attempt to reject my specific claims 
concerning the possibility of an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice. That 
is a possible rebuttal Hume could offer to my objections to his original arguments. This chapter 
will discuss this possible objection to my arguments made in the previous chapter, and then offer 
what I hold is a promising response. After this objection is presented and responded to I will 




property and natural virtue of justice, could actually provide to Hume’s moral theory and more 
specifically his observations about the social pervasiveness of a conceptual understanding of 
property, and virtue of justice.  
Section I: A Possible Comprehensive Objection  
I believe one of the strongest comprehensive objections Hume could offer to my specific 
arguments which attempt to propose the possibility of an instinctual concept of property and 
natural virtue of justice within his moral framework concerns the prospect of the perceived 
possibility of this instinct and natural virtue as a result of accidently inserting a human 
convention into these possible situations during retrospective consideration. If one unknowingly 
inserts what is actually a current human convention into any of Hume’s possible instantiations of 
human existence while considering them, then upon reflection one could mistakenly observe 
these insertions as a fundamental aspect of human nature. For example, Hume could claim that 
of course it seems reasonable to accept that within his state of overabundance physical space 
could be seen as an external good the current possession of which would entail a mine/your 
distinction which comprised a property concept. Furthermore, Hume might admit, it does not 
seem problematic to assume that this property concept could ultimately open the door for a virtue 
of justice, which itself would be the approbation or disapprobation one has towards character 
traits concerning the respect of the current first possession of property. However, Hume could 
claim that the problem with imagining this as an occurrence in his happy state of overabundance, 
or the pre-societal familial group, is not its feasibility to us, but instead the possibility of this 
concept of property and virtue of justice as the accidental result of implanting what is actually a 
human convention that we are currently intimately acquainted with into a scenario in which no 




human convention that is our concept of property and attempted to strip it down to a skeletal 
form, and insert it into possible human scenarios in which it would not exists. Once this is done I 
was able to do the same with the artificial virtue of justice. This, Hume could argue, is what 
ultimately enabled my argumentation to conclude that there would be a simple original 
instinctual concept of property and ultimately a natural virtue of justice present within his happy 
state of overabundance and the pre-societal familial group.
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Simply put, Hume could claim that my arguments have made the mistake of 
misidentifying the actual cause of what I presented as a possible instance of an instinctual 
concept of property and natural virtue of justice. Hume might claim that my inability to distance 
myself from a human convention I have always been acquainted with has resulted in assuming 
others would have the same conceptual understandings I have, and ultimately feel and act in the 
same way that I, and others acquainted with this specific human convention, would, even when 
said others are not acquainted with any such convention. This would falsely promote me to claim 
that instinct was the cause of the perceived possible instinctual concept of property and natural 
virtue of justice when in reality this opinion was caused by my unknowing projection of such a 
concept and virtue into specific states of human existence in which neither would actually exist. 
Hume could argue, for example, that when I claim Smith would feel that Jones, by forcing him 
out of his current sitting spot and sitting down in said spot, had taken his, Smith’s, sitting spot, I 
am mistakenly importing an aspect of my concept of property, and ultimately a sense of 
disapprobation I have towards acts which are the result of a character trait which motivates one 
to act dishonestly with respect to another’s property. The aspects I am importing, Hume could 
claim, are solely the result of the human conventions I have always been immersed in (namely 
                                                             
29 Of course my argumentation also entails the existence of this instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of 
justice present within any possible instantiation of human existence which does not specifically rule out any or all of 




our artificial concept of property and artificial virtue of justice). Hume might claim that if there 
is an unlimited amount of other equal sittings spots, as there would be in his state of 
overabundance, then Smith, upon being forced out of the spot he is sitting in by Jones, would 
simply go sit somewhere else as he would have no property concept or virtue of justice.  
Ultimately, Hume could claim that my argument that our instinctual concept of property 
is a simple mine/your distinction concerning currently possessed external goods, and that our 
sense of disapprobation toward character traits which motivate one to take currently possessed 
external goods from others and approbation towards the opposite character traits, is not an 
inseparable aspect of human nature, but rather it appears to be an inseparable aspect of the 
current society in which I exist, as it is an aspect of a convention with which I have always been 
well acquainted. Thus, I have projected this human convention into Hume’s happy state of 
overabundance, and the pre-societal familial group, when in reality in these scenarios no aspect 
of it would have ever existed. So Hume could return to his claim that there would be no human 
convention, in such a state of human existence, leading to a concept of property, and that 
“without such a convention, no one wou’d ever have dream’d, that there was such a virtue as 
justice” (Treatise 3.2.2.22). This would allow Hume to further support his original position 
concerning his state of overabundance, and all other instantiations of human existence in which 
our concept of property and virtue of justice are useless. Namely that within these scenarios there 
would be no mine/your distinction, thus no concept of property, and ultimately no virtue of 
justice. This would, as presented earlier, allow Hume to advance his position that our concept of 
property and virtue of justice are the result of artificial human conventions as a change in the 
structure of human existence could cause both to vanish.
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I believe this is one of the strongest objections Hume could offer in an attempt to reject 
the arguments I have made supporting the possibility of an instinctual concept of property and 
ultimately a natural virtue of justice, because any further argumentation I give will necessarily 
fall victim to these same criticisms. This is due to the fact that Hume could point out that any 
argument I make concerning a property concept and virtue of justice will unavoidably be, like all 
of my former argumentation, from my point of view which is certainly tainted by the fact that I 
have always been well acquainted with human conventions concerning property and justice. 
Although I believe this does potentially present a problem for my argumentation, I do not think it 
is devastating. First, if Hume were to offer this criticism, I could quickly respond that this 
objection could potentially be raised concerning any of the natural virtues. For example, a 
concept of offspring and virtue of caring for offspring is something with which I have always 
been acquainted with in the same way as my acquaintance with a concept of property and virtue 
of justice. With this in mind, I could claim that it seems as if one could bring forward a similar 
objection, as Hume’s possible objection presented above, and so conclude that we may have 
made a similar error in placing our concept of offspring, and ultimately our virtue of caring for 
offspring, within the realm of instinct. I could claim similarly to Hume’s possible objection 
concerning our concept of property and virtue of justice that our concept of offspring and virtue 
to care for offspring only appears to be based in human nature as a result of forcing a current 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
present necessitous condition of mankind, that, wherever any benefit is bestowed by nature in an unlimited 
abundance, we leave it always in common among the whole human race, and make no subdivisions of right and 
property” (Enquiry 3.1.4). I believe Hume would need to modify this specific claim, if he utilized the above 
objection to my argument, because I believe that examples such as those concerning classroom desks, saved seats in 
open seating situations, and other like scenarios as were presented in the second chapter of this work, give one a 
good reason to accept that we do make subdivisions of right and property, in at least some situations of 
overabundance. Although this specific claim of Hume’s would need to be altered, it would allow Hume to fully 
support his objection to my argument, as these instances of property in situations of overabundance could, as Hume 






human convention into other possible instantiations of human existence where in reality it would 
not exist. This, in turn, would allow me to reply to Hume’s objection by forcing him into a kind 
of stalemate, as all of the natural virtues could be called in to question in the same way Hume 
could call justice into question. 
Although I hold that with this in mind we can understand Hume’s objection as one which 
could affect any of the natural virtues in the same way, and thus not, at first blush, as an 
objection specifically to the placement of the earlier presented concept of property and virtue of 
justice within the realm of human nature, I do however understand it does invite one rather 
obvious reply. Simply put, we have evidence to believe that at the very least our concept of 
offspring and virtue of caring for offspring is firmly placed within human nature, but can we say 
the same about our concept of property and virtue of justice?
31
 If we merely consider the 
impossibility of the continuation of our species without a concept of offspring and virtue of 
caring for offspring, we will quickly see that human convention itself would not be possible 
without said continuation. Hume, if offering this reply, could even point to the fact that we can 
see evidence for an instinctual concept of offspring, and some sort of drive which motivates 
actions of caring for said offspring within non-human animals. “The affection of parents to their 
young proceeds from a peculiar instinct in animals, as well as in our species” (Treatise 2.2.12.5). 
Importantly this is not to claim that Hume holds that animals have a sense of virtue and vice like 
humans, as he surely does not believe this to be the case, “animals have little or no sense of 
                                                             
31 It should be noted that I am merely using the word “evidence” to mean reason in favor of accepting. Although as 
Mackie points out, the questions Hume is attempting to answer “demand… an explanation of the sort typically given 
by the empirical sciences,” I do not wish to appear, especially in this section of the current work, to be recklessly 





virtue or vice” (Treatise 2.1.12.5).
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 Instead this claim is able to provide further evidence for the 
placement of our concept of offspring and even virtue to care for offspring within human nature 
as opposed to human convention. This is because if non-human animals have a concept of 
offspring and drive to care for said offspring, then we are provided with a very good reason to 
reject the claim that our concept of offspring and virtue to care for said offspring is the sole result 
of human convention as we can see fundamental aspects of this concept and virtue at work 
completely outside the realm of human convention.
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Although I hold that it would be difficult for Hume to provide a similar case as the one 
provided above concerning our concept of offspring and virtue to care for offspring for all of the 
natural virtues, it does, at the very least, weaken my reply to his possible objection, as not all of 
the natural virtues would be affected in the same way, and thus there would be no forced 
stalemate. So, if I wish to give the strongest possible reason to believe that an instinctual concept 
of property and natural virtue of justice is possible within Hume’s moral framework, then I must 
also provide some kind of evidence, at least similar in kind to the evidence Hume could 
potentially provide concerning an instinctual concept of offspring and the accompanying natural 
virtue.  
Although initially this may seem like a difficult task, I actually believe that it may be as 
simple and obvious as Hume’s possible evidence for the above concept and virtue concerning 
offspring. It should be noted that Hume actually clearly claims that animals do not have a 
concept of property as they are “incapable of that of right and property” (Treatise 2.1.12.5). 
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 Importantly Hume asserts that animals do feel the passions of pride, humility, love, and hatred, but “the range of 
animal responses is more limited than that of humans” meaning as presented above “animals have little or no sense 
of virtue or vice” (Norton 503, Treatise 2.1.12.5). 
33 More specifically this allows us to conclude that we can observe these aspects of this concept and virtue outside of 
any convention remotely similar to that of the artificial virtues, as Hume holds that animals are unable to form 
abstract notions which conventions, as understood in relation to the artificial virtues, require. For more on this topic 




Importantly though, Hume is considering his definition of property, which is itself a concept 
resulting from a human convention. So, claiming that animals have no concept of property, when 
considering Hume’s definition of property seems trivially true. However, when considering the 
possible instinctual concept of property I presented in the second chapter of this work I believe 
this is no longer the case. Significantly, as Norton points out when considering Hume’s claim 
that animals have no concept of property “Hume might well grant that animals show a territorial 
instinct” (504). I hold that assuming Hume would grant this makes it no longer outlandish to 
claim that animals likely do have a concept of property similar to the concept presented earlier in 
this work, and further more may even have some kind of drive to, at the very least, retain and 
protect said property. (Importantly, this is, of course, not to say animals have a virtue of justice, 
just as Hume’s evidence for the instinctual origin of our concept of offspring and virtue to care 
for said offspring is not evidence that animals have a virtue to care for offspring, but instead that 
similar instincts as the instincts necessary for some of our natural virtues can be observed 
completely outside of the realm of human convention.) A territorial instinct, at its core, seems to 
differ little from a simple original instinctual concept of property (as presented in this work), and 
ultimately, in humans, a virtue of justice. A territorial instinct which entails a simple mine/your 
distinction concerning currently possessed external goods, such as space and a drive which 
motivates actions to keep said space while in current possession of it seems to actually represent 
what I hold is a very similar occurrence within humans, as discussed above. I think the 
observation of birds in a nest or wolves which have marked their territory are prime examples of 
such an instinctual concept and drive. Thus, I hold we are able to observe fundamental aspects of 
the earlier presented concept of property and virtue of justice at work within non-human animals, 




could provide for our concept of offspring and virtue to care for offspring, can be provided in the 
case of our concept of property and virtue of justice (as considered in this work). 
Section II: Consequences of the Categorization of Justice as a Natural Virtue 
I want to devote the last section of this work to an important question which lies at the 
heart of this project. This question being: what difference, if any, does the possibility of the 
categorization of justice as a natural virtue make to Hume’s moral theory? Obviously, one 
difference is this new possibility itself, meaning the possibility of the categorization of justice as 
a natural virtue. Simply meaning if the arguments supplied in this work are successful, then the 
possibility of the re-categorization of justice as a natural virtue, within Hume’s moral 
framework, is conceivable. I believe that this is a worthwhile result. Hume’s ultimate goal, as 
presented by Mackie, is to explain “this curious phenomenon, human morality, a cluster of 
attitudes, dispositions, practices, behavioral tendencies, and so one that we find almost 
universally among men” and endeavor to answer the question “why is it there, and how did it 
develop?” (Mackie 6). Accepting the possibility of the natural virtue of justice is certainly 
important to a project which is in part an endeavor to explore why certain virtues exist, and how 
they developed, because it exposes an alternate explanatory path, and one that I hope this work 
has presented as feasible. 
There is however another important consequence which would result from the actual re-
categorization of justice as a natural virtue. I believe this result could actually provide an 
advantage to Hume’s moral theory by helping to better explain Hume’s observations about the 
social pervasiveness of a conceptual understanding of property and virtue of justice. Hume 
claims that “the convenience, or rather necessity, which leads to justice, is so universal, and 




not without some scrutiny, that we are able to ascertain its true origin” (Enquiry 3.2.47). Of 
course by “true origin” Hume is referring to his proposed artificial origin of justice. So, Hume is 
claiming that a property concept and virtue of justice are the result of necessity, which of course 
aligns with his claim that artificial virtues are human conventions which are created to meet the 
needs and necessities of mankind. Significantly though, this passage seems to also commit Hume 
to the stance that our concept of property and virtue of justice are universally held and utilized 
among all of mankind. He claims that the necessity which leads to a property concept and virtue 
of justice is universal, and this results in this concept and virtue taking place in all societies and 
interestingly in all societies it even points toward the same rules
34
 (Enquiry 3.2.47). This, Hume 
admits, makes it difficult to see this concept and virtue’s true artificial origin, as a natural origin 
is a tempting explanation. 
Although I do not wish to claim that it is impossible for an artificial human convention 
which is the result of a universally encountered necessity of mankind, to become a universally 
utilized solution to said necessity, I certainly do think it adds a dubious element, albeit a small 
one, to Hume’s claims concerning virtue. At its core this uncertain element of Hume’s position 
requires us to accept that no group of people separated from all other groups created some 
alternative human convention as a solution to the problem the limited and uncertain supply of 
material goods presents. With this in mind, I hold that I can confidently propose that especially 
when considering Hume’s suggested universality of our concept of property and virtue of justice 
that the simple original instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice offered in this 
work would enable Hume to better explain this element of universality. If our concept of 
property and virtue of justice arises from an instinct embedded within human nature, then it 
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would make perfect sense that we see all societies with a concept of property and virtue of 
justice. It would even, since the instinctual concept and natural virtue offered in this work are 
merely seeds from which artificial human conventions can grow and develop explain the 
differences in the particular rules and laws concerning property that we see from society to 
society. Ultimately I wish to propose that when considering Hume’s claim concerning 
universality, the instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice offered in this work 
provide a simpler and much more cogent explanation than the artificial concept of property and 
artificial virtue of justice which Hume offers. Although this not a reason in and of itself to accept 
the claims made in this work, it does offer one result of the re-categorization of the virtue of 
justice, which I think could actually strengthen Hume’s position by eliminating a claim which 





















 The goal of this work was twofold. First, I presented Hume’s major arguments in which 
he concludes that an instinctual concept of property and ultimately a natural virtue of justice are 
impossible. Second, I responded to each of these arguments in an attempt to show that Hume was 
mistaken to assert the impossibility of an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of 
justice within his moral framework. This enabled me to conclude that the possibility of an 
instinctual concept of property and the re-categorization of justice as a natural virtue are viable 
possibilities within Hume’s moral framework, and that these may also be commitments which 
offer a better explanation of the virtue of justice itself, then does Hume’s explanation concerning 
an artificial origin, specifically when considering the pervasive nature of this virtue which Hume 
himself prominently notes. Ultimately, I hope this work has shown that the existence of an 
instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice are not only conceivable within 
Hume’s moral framework, but are also possibilities which should be taken seriously as an 
explanation of this kind offers a clear, concise, and in some ways improved description of the 
origin of the virtue of justice.  
 Although I must acknowledge that no reason or reasons have been presented which 
necessarily force the re-categorization of justice as a natural virtue within Hume’s moral 
framework, I do believe that this work as a whole is important to Hume’s moral theory in 
general. First, as presented earlier in this work, Hume claims that for justice to be categorized as 
a natural virtue, meaning it is itself the result of a simple original instinct embedded within 
human nature, then a concept of property must too be the result of some simple original instinct 




there that ever heard of such an instinct? Or is this a subject, in which new discoveries can be 
made? We may as well expect to discover, in the body, new senses, which had before escaped 
the observation of all mankind” (Enquiry 3.2.40). At this point I hold that I can confidently assert 
that it does in fact appear to be the case that this is a subject in which new
35
 discoveries can be 
made, and importantly that the discovery of an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue 
of justice is far less outlandish than the incredibly implausible discovery of a new human sense 
which no member of the human race has yet to notice. So, I hold that Hume has made an 
important error in claiming that the discovery of an instinctual concept of property and natural 
virtue of justice is impossible, as seen in his attempt to assign the same level of doubt to the 
discovery of an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice as to the discovery of 
a new human sense. I believe this is significant to Hume’s moral theory in general because it 
introduces an error in Hume’s assumption that the categorization of justice as an artificial virtue 
is nearly self-evident, and instead offers strong reasons to believe the opposite (the categorization 
of justice as a natural virtue) is certainly possible, and may be true. Accordingly, the presentation 
of this possible natural explanation of the virtue of justice impacts Hume’s moral theory in 
general, by offering a feasible explanation of the natural origin of the virtue of justice, which 
Hume clearly held to be an impossible task. 
Furthermore, I hold that the arguments presented in this work may also be able to offer an 
explanation as to why, from specific perspectives, the virtue of justice seems obviously artificial. 
As was presented above, Hume compares the discovery of an instinctual concept of property and 
                                                             
35 It should be noted that by “new” I mean only to refer to the possible evidence for an instinctual concept of 
property and natural virtue of justice which is ‘new to Hume’ or ‘new within Hume’s moral framework.’ As was 
pointed out my Dr. Mathew Hickey, while commenting on this work, Aristotle among others note the placement of 
private property within human nature,  meaning the discoveries necessary to present the possibility of an instinctual 
concept of property and natural virtue of justice, within Hume’s moral framework, are not new to philosophical 




ultimately a natural virtue of justice to the discovery of a new human sense (Enquiry 3.2.40). 
From Hume’s perspective, that is the perspective of examining the complex and multifaceted 
rules and laws surrounding property and ultimately the virtue of justice, this comparison is 
certainly cohesive. As was presented in the second chapter of this work I undoubtedly agree with 
Hume that there is clearly no instinct or instincts which inform us in all of the current culturally 
accepted methods of the acquisition of property. Thus, due to the fact that Hume is examining 
the complex rules and laws which surround our current concept of property, it seems clear that 
he would hold that the discovery of an instinct from which these rules and laws originated was 
absurd. However, I believe the claim of an instinctual origin of our concept of property and 
ultimately a natural origin of our virtue of justice becomes far less outlandish when considering, 
as this work did, the possibility of a simple original instinctual concept of property, and natural 
sense of disapprobation towards character traits which motivate some to take other’s property, 
from which these complex rules and laws have grown and developed.  
I hold that it is even possible that in some cases the simple original instincts may be 
heavily cloaked by the human conventions which they have enabled to grow and develop. To 
exemplify this point consider the instincts of hunger and thirst. As was argued in the second 
chapter of this work, we can find some clear examples of human conventions which have grown 
from these instincts, but I would now like to argue that we may even be able to imagine specific 
scenarios in which human conventions actually conceal their instinctual origin. Take for example 
a fictional instantiation of human existence in which a community comes together so often to eat 
and drink that no individual members of said community ever feels hungry or thirsty. This 
meaning that no member of this community could ever feel the instincts of hunger or thirst, 




throughout the day and night. I believe it is uncontroversial to point out that the simple original 
instincts of hunger and thirst would still be fundamental aspects of the human nature of each 
member of this community, even though this complex human convention was in place. I believe 
this can be supported by simply imagining some member of this community missing the 
scheduled eating or drinking time and becoming hungry or thirsty. I likewise hold that these two 
instincts would also be at the core of this rather outlandish human convention. Even though on 
any initial examination of the motive of members of this community to eat and drink one might 
be tempted to claim human convention as the source, I believe we, with a scrupulous eye, can 
confidently understand this human convention to be nothing but a rather complex development 
of the simple original instincts of hunger and thirst. With this in mind, I believe we can see that 
in some cases convoluted and complex human conventions can nearly conceal their true 
instinctual origin, even while this instinctual origin is actually acting as the fundamental and 
unchanging core of such conventions. 
 Consequently, I believe that this work can offer an explanation as to why Hume may 
have held the discovery of an instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice to be as 
unlikely as the discovery of a new human sense. Hume was looking at the present point of the 
extended timeline of the development of our concept of property and virtue of justice, so from 
his perspective any simple original instinctual concept of property would need to encompass a 
great number of complexities. With the arguments presented in this work I hold one can feasibly 
understand the current complex human conventions surrounding property and justice to be 
growths from the simple original instinctual concept of property and natural virtue of justice. So, 
much like in the above example concerning a community with strictly ritualized eating and 




evidence in favor of dismissing an instinctual origin, but I hope this work has shown that doing 
so, within Hume’s moral framework, is an mistake.  
The second reason I believe this work is important to Hume’s moral theory in general 
concerns Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues itself. This work has presented 
the possibility of the re-categorization of justice as a natural virtue, but I hold that it has also, 
albeit in an indirect manner, shown a possible method which could be utilized in arguing for the 
re-categorization of many, if not all, of Hume’s artificial virtues as natural virtues. Although I 
understand this is a topic which would need to be explored in its own dedicated work, I would 
still like to briefly consider it here. Specifically, if the argument in this work concerning the 
possibility of simple original instincts acting as seeds from which complex human conventions 
can grow and develop is accepted, then it seems possible that other virtues which Hume presents 
as artificial may be forced into the realm of possible re-categorization.
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 Although further 
argumentation would be necessary to explore the possibility of the re-categorization of each 
artificial virtue, I hold that this could have a potentially significant impact on Hume’s moral 
theory in general, as it offers a strong starting point from which arguments for the re-
categorization of all Hume’s artificial virtues as natural virtues could take hold. This possible re-
categorization of all of Hume’s artificial virtues as natural virtues would, of course, have a 
significant impact on Hume’s moral theory in general, as it could call into question the 
distinction between natural and artificial virtues, and could lead to the disbanding of this 
distinction altogether. 
Although it is not possible to go into detail, without the development of an additional 
work, concerning each of the virtues Hume names as artificial when contemplating the 
                                                             
36 It is likewise important to note that I am also assuming the argumentation which rejects Hume’s claims 




possibility of the success of this work acting as a foundation for claims concerning the re-
categorization of other, or all, artificial virtues as natural virtues, I do think offering one brief but 
concrete example could be helpful. Take, for instance, the virtue of allegiance to one’s 
government, which Hume firmly places within the category of artificial virtues. By utilizing the 
methods and arguments provided in this work concerning the virtue of justice I hold that one 
could make a strong case for the possible re-categorization of this virtue of allegiance to one’s 
government from artificial to natural. As was shown above one could circumvent the problems 
associated with the complexity of a virtue, like allegiance to one’s government, by simply 
arguing that within human nature there exists a simple original instinctual concept of a leader, 
and a corresponding instinctual, or natural, sense of approbation towards character traits which 
motivate oneself and others to abide by some current leader’s requests. From this, as was done 
above concerning the virtue of justice, one could argue that our concept of government and 
virtue of allegiance to one’s government are founded in simple original instincts embedded 
within the human breast, and over time complex human conventions have grown and developed 
from said instincts, and formed the concept and virtue we are familiar with today. This would 
enable, as was done concerning the virtue of justice, one to search for this simple original 
instinctual concept of a leader and instinctual sense of approbation towards character traits which 
motivate oneself and others to abide by a current leader’s requests within human nature, instead 
of a complex multifaceted concept and virtue, which could, as Hume points out, never be the 
sole result of instinct, and must instead be the result of human convention, aimed at public 
utility. This would also aide in explaining, as was done in the case of justice, the widespread and 
pervasive nature of the virtue of allegiance to one’s government that can be observed throughout 




the rules and laws surrounding different communities’ concept of a leader or government and 
virtue of allegiance to one’s leader or government.  
I believe I could even provide similar evidence for the instinctual origin of the virtue of 
allegiance to one’s government as Hume provided for the instinctual origin of the virtue of 
caring for one’s offspring, and as I provided for the instinctual origin of the virtue of justice. If 
we again look to non-human animals, as was done in the third chapter of this work, and take, for 
example, the existence of an alpha within any group of social animals, I think we can see at work 
an instinctual concept of a leader, and some kind of motivation to abide or comply with said 
leader’s demands. At its core, as was the case with the virtue of caring for one’s offspring and 
justice, this instinct within non-human animals seems to embody fundamental aspects of our 
concept of government, and virtue of allegiance to one’s government. Thus, as was done when 
considering the virtue of justice, I believe we could likely show that a concept of a leader or 
government, and a virtue of allegiance to one’s leader or government could be shown to exists, in 
some simple form, in nearly any instantiation of human existence (which, of course, does not 
explicitly rule it out)
37
. Even when considering the pre-societal family most would likely agree 
that some member of said family would act as a leader and assume a similar role and set of 
responsibilities as would the alpha of any group of social animals. So, we very well may be able 
to point to a simple original instinctual concept of a leader, and consequently a natural virtue to 
abide by said leader’s demands, from which our artificial human conventions of government and 
many rules and laws related to the virtue of allegiance to one’s government could have grown 
and developed. 
 With this example in mind, I hope it is clear why I hold that the argumentation in this 
work could be utilized as a starting point for other arguments which attempt to propose the 
                                                             




possible re-categorization of artificial virtues as natural virtues. Again, it is important to point out 
that this was not the goal of the current work, but is instead, I believe, a possible significant 
consequence of the potential success of this work to Hume’s moral theory in general. In short, if 
there appears to be relatively strong argumentation in favor of the re-categorization of each of 
the artificial virtues as natural virtues, then Hume’s distinction, as presented in this work, would 
dissolve. That is, if one is able to argue that we can, as was done in the case of justice in this 
work, and briefly considered in the case of allegiance to one’s government, discover simple 
original instincts at the core of all of our artificial virtues, which have, in time, enabled the 
growth and development of human conventions we understand today as any given artificial 
virtue, then Hume’s distinction between artificial virtues and natural virtues would vanish.
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This, of course, does not entail that pure human convention is impossible, but rather that the 
arguments in this work could be utilized as a possible starting point for considerations 
concerning the possible re-categorization of other, or even possibly all, virtues Hume labeled as 
artificial.  
 Finally, although I hold that providing evidence for the possible re-categorization of the 
virtue of justice from an artificial virtue to a natural virtue within Hume’s moral framework is 
important, and the arguments involved may even have a significant consequence for Hume’s 
                                                             
38 It should be noted that J.L Mackie does consider this same topic in his work Hume’s Moral Theory, and even 
concludes that Hume’s distinction between natural and artificial virtues should be dissolved. Mackie argues that the 
variations in our sympathy necessitate human conventions to be corrected. From this Mackie is able to conclude that 
all virtues are artificial, as “natural virtues are, after all, a further set of artificial virtues” as they too result from 
human convention (123). Although this is an interesting point at which to attack Hume’s distinction, I hold that it 
ultimately fails in dissolving Hume’s distinction altogether as one could argue that we need only to imagine the pre-
societal family to unearth the true natural artificial distinction, because in that instantiation of human existence the 
variations in our sympathy would be minimal to none. It also fails to eliminate the possibility of natural virtues 
which are the result of simple original instincts embedded within Human nature, but which in time can sprout 
complex human conventions, as was argued in this work is the case concerning justice, and possibly other virtues. 
This is not ruled out because even if variations in our sympathy do necessitate human convention to be corrected 
that does not rule out the possibility of some virtues resulting from instincts which existed within Human nature 





moral theory in general, I would like to end this work by presenting something Hume points out 
in his first enquiry, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
39
 Hume claims that “moral 
philosophy, or the science of human nature, may be treated after two different manners” (An 
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 1.1). Hume presents the first of these two different 
manners is the easy and obvious and humane philosophy which has its foundation in common 
sense, meaning our tastes and sentiments, and is thus able to “make us feel the difference 
between vice and virtue” (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 1.1). The second 
manner of philosophy is the accurate and abstruse philosophy. This philosophy “regard[s] human 
nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those 
principles, which regulate our understanding, excite our sentiments, and make us approve or 
blame any particular object, action or behaviour” (An Enquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding 1.2).  
The reason I believe this to be an important distinction to note is that that current work 
appears to fall within the second manner of moral philosophy, which Hume presents as important 
and necessary, and having merit, but ultimately subservient to the humane philosophy, and 
something which on its own would be of little interest. Significantly though, Hume argues that 
the abstruse philosophy is subservient to the humane philosophy in the important role of aiding 
the humane philosophy in “attain[ing] a sufficient degree of exactness” (An Enquiry Concerning 
Human Understanding 1.5). Hume ultimately asserts that one ought to “be a philosopher; but 
amidst all your philosophy, be still a man” (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 1.4). 
This meaning, I believe, do not get lost in ventures of accurate and abstruse philosophy without 
considering the importance and dominance of humane philosophy. When considering this work, 
                                                             
39 It is important to note, as was done in the first chapter of this work, that Hume’s second enquiry, An Enquiry 





then, I hold that although it is a work of abstruse philosophy it is able to aid humane philosophy 
in providing exactness to our sentiments of approbation towards character traits which motivate 




























Baillie, James. Hume on Morality. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.  
Barnett, Randy E. The Structure of Liberty: Justice and The Rule of Law.  New York: Oxford  
 University Press, 1988. Print.  
Beauchamp, Tom L., ed. David Hume: An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. 1998.  
 New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. Print. 
Cohon, Rachel, "Hume's Moral Philosophy." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Fall 
 2010 ed. Ed. Edward N. Zalta. Web. 3 Sept. 2013. 
Fieser, James. “Hume’s Motivational Distinction Between Natural and Artificial Virtue.” British  
 Journal of The History of Philosophy 5 (1997): 373-388. Web. 6 March 2014. 
Mackie, J.L. Hume’s Moral Theory. Boston:  Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980. Print. 
Norton, David Fate, and Mary J. Norton, eds. David Hume: A Treatise of Human Nature. 2000.  
 New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Print. 
 
 
